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ABSTRACT 
 
 
THE EU ENERGY SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND TURKEY’S 
POSSIBLE MEMBERSHIP 
 
Tabak, Ayşegül 
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Ass. Prof. Paul Williams 
April 2009 
 
This thesis aims to understand changing energy security considerations of 
the European Union and in this context Turkey’s increasing chance to be a 
European member. In order to do that, the study targets the question : “How did 
European energy security considerations enhance and how does this situation 
influence Turkey’s possible membership process, due to latter’s geo-strategic 
position?”. European Union, as the other import-energy dependent actors, has 
experienced the negative consequences of this dependency. Particulary, the 
energy’s being used as a political weapon has made the “energy security” more 
momentous for the Community. In this respect, energy security policies has 
attracted more attention. As a result of one of these policies, diversification, the 
Union has started to give more consideration to diversified energy suppliers and 
transit countries. Accordingly, Turkey has gained a significant attention as an 
 iv
important transit country, with the strategic position near to main energy 
suppliers. Thus, this thesis proposes that Turkey’s geo-strategic position will 
enhance Turkey’s significance for the Union and open the way for its Union  
membership. Relying on official EU documents and  literature, this study reaches 
the conclusion that energy security is very important for the EU and in order to 
enhance its situation the Union will try its best. In this regard, Turkey’s religious 
and cultural diffrences seems to be less important than Union’s interests and thus 
Turkey has an enhanced possibility to be an EU member. 
 
Keywords: European Union, Energy Security, Green Papers on Energy, 
Turkey, Membership 
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ÖZET 
 
 
AB ENERJİ GÜVENLİĞİ ANLAYIŞI VE TÜRKİYE’NİN OLASI ÜYELİĞİ 
 
Tabak, Ayşegül 
Master Tezi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Paul Williams 
Nisan 2009 
 
 Bu çalışma, AB’nin enerji güvenliği anlayışını ve bu bağlamda 
Türkiye’nin artan üyelik şansını anlamaya çalışır. Bunu gerçekleştirebilmek için, 
bu tez şu soruyu cevaplamayı hedefler: “Avrupa’nın enerji anlayışı nasıl değişti 
ve Türkiye’nin jeostratejik pozisyonuna bağlı olarak bu durum Türkiye’nin olası 
üyeliğini nasıl etkiler?”. Diğer ithal enerji bağımlı aktörler gibi Avrupa Birliği de 
bu bağlılığın olumsuz sonuçlarını yaşamıştır. Özellikle, enerjinin politik bir güç 
olarak kullanılması, “enerji güvenliğini” Topluluk için daha önemli yapmıştır. Bu 
bağlamda enerji güvenliği politikaları daha çok dikkat çekmiştir. Bu 
politikalardan biri olan, çeşitlendirme sonucu, Birlik farklı enerji kaynakları ve 
geçiş ülkelerine daha çok önem vermeye başlamıştır. Böylece, ana enerji 
kaynaklarına yakın olan stratejik yeri ile, bir geçiş ülkesi olarak, Türkiye, dikkate 
değer bir önem kazanmıştır. Bu yüzden, bu çalışma, Türkiye’nin jeostratejik 
pozisyonun Türkiye’nin Birlik için önemini arttıracağına ve Birlik üyeliği için 
 vi
yolunu açacağını savunur. Bu çalışma, AB resmi belgelerine ve literatüre 
dayanarak, enerji güvenliğinin AB için çok önemli olduğunu ve durumunu 
geliştirmek için Birliğin elinden geleni yapacağı sonucuna varır. Bu bağlamda, 
Türkiye’nin dini ve kültürel farkları, Birlik çıkarları karşısında daha önemsiz kalır 
ve böylece Türkiye’nin AB üyesi olmak için şansı artar. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Enerji Güvenliği, Yeşil Kitap, 
Türkiye, Üyelik 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 As every nation state is dependent on energy, energy-import dependent 
countries are more vulnerable to disruption in their supplies. Starting with the 1973 
oil crisis, continuing with various other problems arising from the Middle East, and 
lastly culminating in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, energy security has crystallized 
as a well-known concept in international relations. Every nation has given 
considerable attention to this concept and has struggled to enhance its energy-
security situation. 
 
With the largest economy in the world, the European Union is one key actor that has 
understandably developed a keen interest in enhancing energy security. Being 
dependent on imported energy for over fifty percent of its energy supply, a figure 
that may rise to seventy percent over the next twenty to thirty years, the Union has 
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focused more attention on energy security. In this context, Union has been publishing 
documents focusing on energy security, notably a series of green papers, and has 
devoted more consideration to enhancing its relations with energy supplier and 
transit countries.  
 
The Russia-Ukraine dispute and Russia’s related energy cut caused the Union to size 
up its vulnerability and consider energy-security precautions more carefully. 
Diversification, by source, supplier or transit country, has been the centerpiece of 
options the EU has been weighing. In this regard,  relations with alternative energy 
suppliers in the Middle East and Caspian, as well as energy transit candidate 
countries, like Turkey, have become critical. 
 
Turkey, as an official candidate member country since 1999, has been struggling 
since 1959 to join what has become the EU. Like every candidate country, it has had 
to fulfill an increasing number of common obligations, yet has also experienced 
unique barriers stemming from its disparate culture and religion. Yet, perhaps due to 
Union’s energy security concerns, Turkey may have gained an invaluable source of 
leverage in the membership process. 
 
Turkey is uniquely poised to serve as an export conduit for some of the world’s main 
energy suppliers in the Middle East and Caspian basin and it has joined many 
pipeline projects originating from these regions to Europe. Some of these pipelines 
have been established, whereas some remain in the planning process. If most of the 
projects are actualized, Turkey will become an essential energy hub for Europe. Yet, 
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even if only some of the projects are actualized, they will give Turkey greater 
relative power. 
 
This thesis aims to examine the geo-strategic power that Turkey gains in its relations 
with the European Union from the possibility of its becoming an energy hub. In this 
regard, the Union’s energy energy security concerns, and Turkey’s place within 
them, will be examined in detail.  
 
The thesis starts with a general overview of energy security in order to establish a 
framework for understanding the EU’s perception. Then it continues with the second 
chapter, which starts by explaining the difficulty of arriving at a concrete security 
definition. 
 
The second part of this chapter covers a more detailed study of energy security study. 
After discussing the evolution of the energy security concept, the concept is 
examined from the different perspectives of consumer and producer. However, since 
the main aim of the thesis is to study the EU’s energy security concerns, the 
consumer view especially that of the Union, is studied in more detail. In the third part 
of this chapter, the policies needed to secure energy, particularly from the consumer 
perspective, are analyzed. 
 
The third chapter elaborates the Union’s particular conception of energy security. 
This chapter identifies the EU’s basic assumptions about energy security and what it 
proposes to overcome any related challenges. In the first part, the evolution of the 
Union’s energy security concept is examined, and then in the second part, the EU 
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discourse on“energy security” is discussed. This part consists of a detailed study of 
all green papers prepared by the Commission on energy emphasize the Community 
view on energy and its proposed policies on energy.  
 
The fourth chapter examines the European energy policies needed to enhance energy 
security. The common energy policy is suggested as the elementary policy objective 
and the internal and external energy policies are examined in this context. This 
chapter continues with a more elaborate study of European internal energy policy 
centered on the Green Paper 2006 and ends with an analysis of European external 
energy policy, which covers EU relations with major and alternative energy 
suppliers, Russia, Middle East, Norway and Caspian region countries. 
 
In the fifth part, Turkey’s importance in EU’s energy security concerns and its 
possible future membership are examined. This chapter starts with study of pipelines 
passing via Turkey and suggests the increased importance of Turkey in this context. 
In the second part, the challenges for Turkey to be an energy corridor are 
acknowledged and examined in greater detail. Geopolitics of Kazakh and Turkmen 
oil and gas, bans on re-exporting and re-selling, ethnic conflict, increased turbulence 
in the Middle East and Russian ambitions over the BlackSea and Caspian sea regions 
are studied as supplier-origin challenges. Challenges stemming from the Union are 
also examined. In this regard, this part focuses on the energy security concerns of 
United Kingdom, France, Germany and Poland. After mentioning the challenges, the 
last part of the fifth chapter offers an interpretation of Turkey’s possible membership. 
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This thesis uses fundamentally textual analysis methodology. The EU official 
documents and papers are analyzed in order to understand European perceptions of 
energy security and to understand the European stance. Furthermore, the literature is 
reviewed in order to see different comments and interpretations on this subject.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
ENERGY SECURITY 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to establish a framework for understanding the “energy security” 
concept and, in this regard, examines different “energy security” definitions and 
policies. The first part of this chapter focuses on security more broadly. It explains 
the difficulty of finding a concrete definition of security and the need for broadening 
the content of the concept. 
 
The second section focuses on “energy security”.  After discussing the evolution of 
this concept, the “energy security” concept is examined from the different 
perspectives of consumers and producers. 
 
The last part of the chapter analyzes briefly what kind of energy policies are 
preferred in order to secure energy, particularly for consumers. The main policies 
comprise diversification in terms of supply source or energy mix; having security 
margin in terms of strategic reserves or adequate storage capacity along the supply 
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chain; cooperation, whether among consumers, among producers or between 
producers and consumers; and high-quality and timely information. 
 
 
2.1 The Difficulty of Defining “Security” and the Need for Broadening the 
Concept 
 
Security, with its primary aim of survival, is an overriding imperative for nations. In 
order to attain other determined targets, each nation has to achieve its basic security. 
Although a common security definition, acceptable to everyone, cannot easily be 
reached, it is the primary aim of every nation to attain its preferred conditions of 
security.  
 
Security is a subjective and evolving concept. As there are many different actors and 
issue areas, there are equally diverse security considerations and definitions. As 
Buzan (1991: 7) states, there are “moral, ideological and normative” features of 
security and they make it difficult to achieve a security definition agreed by 
everyone. As Lipschutz (1995: 10) states; 
Security has a specific meaning only within a specific social context. It 
emerges and changes as a result of discourses and discursive actions 
intended to reproduce historical structures and subjects within states and 
among them. To be sure, policymakers define security on the basis of a 
set of assumptions regarding vital interests, plausible enemies, and 
possible scenarios, all of which grow, to a not-insignificant extent, out of 
the specific historical and social context of a particular country and some 
understanding of what is ‘out there’. 
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Thus, to give a concrete security definition, which is appropriate to everyone, is not 
possible. Until now, security has carried a so-called “Cold War” dimension, by 
which the state and the military dimension command the greatest attention (Bilgin, 
2005: 16). Yet, changing conditions and necessities have altered security concerns, 
thus leading to new emphases and the broadening of the security context (Tuchman 
1989: 162; Buzan 1991: 6).  
 
With the economy, military and technology so dependent on energy, energy and 
security access to it have gained greater stature within the new security framework. 
As Roberts (2004: 5) suggests, “we live today in a world completely dominated by 
energy.” As Roberts (2004: 5-6) also states, energy “is the currency of political and 
economic power” and it is what “determines the hierarchy of nations”, which means 
that political and economic power are highly influenced by a country’s possession of 
energy. 
 
 On the other hand, limited sources of energy and an expected decrease in its supply 
have made energy a central concern in security calculations. In the contemporary 
period, energy is an obviously vital part of modern life and survival and a major 
source of security in all its varied facets. Thus, with every nation aiming to retain or 
improve its relative position on energy related issues, this leads to a logical focus on 
“energy security”. It is in this context that “energy security” has become a key 
concern in today’s international relations and security environment. 
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2.2. The Concept of “Energy Security”  
 
2.2.1 Evolution of the Concept 
 
Although “energy security” as an undeniable concept of contemporary international 
relations studies is gaining greater attention now, it is not an entirely new, post-Cold 
War issue. In fact, energy security concerns are nearly a century old. For Bahgat 
(2006: 965), “energy security” concept began to be defined and its implications 
examined after the first oil shock of 1973. On the other hand, Yergin (2006: 69) 
suggests that “energy security” emerged as a significant issue as early as World War 
I (WWI).  
 
Yergin (2005: 52) bases his argument on the decision of first lord of British 
Admiralty, Winston Churchill, just before World War I. This is when Churchill 
transformed the Royal Navy from coal to oil and as a result of this decision, the 
source of the fleet’s propulsion turned to Iranian oil in place of Welsh coal. 
Recognizing the new risk entailed by this historic conversion, Churchill stated that 
“safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone”, thereby advancing a 
fundamental principle of energy security, diversification of supply (Yergin, 2005: 
52).  
 
On the other hand, oil became a critical factor in WWII, and this importance grew in 
the following decades. Crises originating in the Middle East gave energy security a 
higher profile (Yergin, 2005: 53). The first oil shock of 1973 is among the most well-
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known crises in the Middle East. It emerged when the members of OAPEC 
(Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) cut oil production and 
shipment to the US, South Africa, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The embargo 
caused uncertainty and led to panic buying, thus increasing oil prices, and so it 
became clear that energy could be used as a political weapon.  
 
Then, with the 1978-1980 Iranian Revolution and the 1980 Iraqi invasion of Iran, it 
became clear that oil prices are highly volatile and can be easily manipulated. With 
the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq War, increasing oil prices generated by events in 
the Middle East made energy security a more acute problem. Yet, although Middle 
Eastern problems have considerable energy-related impacts, problems of energy 
security do not emerge only from this region. 
 
 In 2006 Russia cut gas supplies due to the dispute with Ukraine, and once more it 
became obvious that energy could be used as a strong political weapon against 
imported energy-dependent countries. With Tehran’s even more recent threats to 
disrupt Persian Gulf oil shipments (BBC News, June 2006) in connection with  rising 
tension over Iran’s nuclear program, the importance of energy security has been 
underscored again. Accordingly, it became obvious that threats to energy security 
have multiple origins and energy can be used as a political weapon. 
 
 With regard to concerns over energy supply dependence, the most obvious threat to 
energy security arises from supply disruptions1 and past experiences prove that there 
                                                 
1 Adams (2003: 47) defines energy disruptions as disturbances to the world oil flow, but it can be 
enlarged to include all energy flows. 
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are many possibilities for energy disruptions. Disruptions can emerge from political 
instability in the supplier or consumer region; market instability; accidental 
disturbances; and terrorist activities. The political instability of the supplier, which 
Lesbirel (2004: 8) defines as force majeure, can originate from domestic political 
unrest2, war related damage, and political objectives and transportation facilities of 
the supplier countries3.  
 
On the other hand, Lesbirel (2004: 8) states that disruptions can also originate on the 
demand side in the case of embargo4 or as a result of insufficient investment in 
upstream sectors. Possible accidents, that can take place at any stage of drilling, 
production, pipeline transfer and vessel transportation, may also cause supply cuts 
(Lesbirel, 2004: 8). Furthermore, terrorist activities targeting energy drilling, 
production and transportation centers are also among possible risks that may lead to 
energy disruption. Clawson (1995: 175) also states that rapid economic growth of 
developing countries5 and economic problems6 are among risks that may lead to 
energy disruptions. 
                                                 
2 “Armed conflicts or significant levels of civil unrest in major energy-exporting countries might 
result in crisis conditions if sizeable levels of petroleum or other energy resources were kept from the 
market (or a such a threat appeared immediately) and sufficient excess production appeared to be 
unavailable from other producers/regions” (Clawson, 1995: 173). For Clawson, also  regime changes 
may lead to supply shortage and destabilization of energy-producing regions. The armed conflicts and 
political unrest have major effects on market and economy of a particular country, and if the country 
is one of the few supplier states, then the events have impacts on world energy markets. 
3As Clawson (1995:175) states, since there are few energy shipping transportation points such as; 
Strait of Hormuz, Stait of Malacca, Panama Canal, Rotterdam Harbor, or through Bosporus, any 
disruption of crude oil or product shipment at this points could result in a crisis. 
4 For the embargo conditions, Clawson (1995:174) mentions the growing political strenght and 
influence of the environmental movements. He believes that this kind of developments will have more 
considerable effects in the future. Due to the growing environmental awereness, it can be suggested 
that he seems right. 
5 “Sustained and dramatic economic growth by developing countries in Asia and Latin America 
during the next twenty-five years could put strains on world energy markets and contribute to the 
onset of crisis conditions” (Clawson, 1995: 175). 
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It is clear that there exist various risks can lead to energy disruptions and supply 
shortages for import- energy dependent countries. Securing energy is not solely 
about geology anymore, as geopolitics has also gained importance. To preserve a 
secure supply of energy is significantly important for the overall security of nations 
and securing energy has assumed an even greater place in state strategies and 
politics. 
 
 
2.2.2 Definition of “Energy Security”  
 
“Energy security” can be examined from the two sides of the market. As mentioned 
in the previous part, security is a socially constructed concept and for security related 
issues, there is not one concrete definition. The threat as perceived by one party of 
the game does not automatically define the threat for the other party. In that case, in 
order to define security, different opinions should be taken into considerations, as is 
especially the case for “energy security”.  
 
Since there is an energy market and since there are two sides of the market, producer 
and consumer, “energy security” can be defined from each side’s particular 
perspective. However, since energy is perceived as a security matter mostly by 
imported energy-dependent nations, studies of “energy security” are generally 
dominated by the scholars in these countries and thus the given “energy security” 
                                                                                                                                          
6 For the economic problems Clawson (1995:175) focuses on the adverse international economic 
conditions and suggests that they will possibly develop gradually or over a short period of time, and 
will have considerible impact on crisis conditions. 
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definitions generally are strongly imprinted with consumer perspectives, on which 
this study focuses. 
 
The primary notion of “energy security” for consumers is reliable supply with 
limited vulnerability at affordable prices. The most common used version is defined 
by UNDP (2001: 112) as: 
The continuous availability of energy in varied forms, in sufficient          
quantities, and at reasonable prices. It means limited vulnerability to 
transient or longer disruptions of imported supplies. It also means the 
availability of local and imported resources to meet, over time and at 
reasonable prices, the growing demand for energy. Environmental 
challenges, liberalization and deregulation, and the growing dominance 
of market forces all have profound implications for energy security. 
 
 
Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005: 9) offer a similar conception: 
Energy security is assurance of ability to access the energy resources 
required for the continued development of national power. In more 
specific terms, it is the provision of affordable, reliable, diverse, and 
ample supplies of oil and gas and adequate infrastructure to deliver these 
supplies to market (Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005: 9). 
 
 
However, they acknowledge that the concept has acquired a wider dimension. 
According to them, the concept now encompasses whole energy types and entire 
infrastructures, whereas initially, it was more narrowly focused on the flow of oil. 
Like Kalicki and Goldywn, Costantini et al (2007: 210) define energy security along 
the lines proposed by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and suggest that it is 
“the availability of a regular supply of energy at an affordable price”. Winrow (2007: 
219), citing Barton et al. (2004: 5), defines the concept in a similar way: 
Energy security has been defined as a condition in which citizens and 
businesses have access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices 
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for the foreseeable future free from serious risk of major disruption of 
service. 
 
Downs (2004: 22), citing Yergin, once more suggests that the objective of energy 
security for the consumers is “to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at 
reasonable prices,” yet he states that it should be attained in a way that “does not 
jeopardize major national values and objectives”.  
 
It should be noted that energy security can also be analyzed from the perspective of 
producing countries. In its basic conception, energy security for the producer is 
related to security of demand (Yergin, 2006: 1). That is, energy-producing countries 
aim to secure continuity of demand for their supply. On the other hand, as is the case 
for consumers, the producers also seek reasonable prices, but “reasonable” in this 
case pertains to what permits them to make new investments, together with 
guaranteed markets (Winrow, 2007: 219). Moreover, economic independence is also 
crucial for producers, many of which achieved political independence only in the last 
century. As Quandt (1981: 3) and Maachou (1982: 38) state, producer countries seek 
to reduce their dependence on foreigners for discovering, extracting, transporting and 
marketing the energy. Maachou (1982: 389) also suggests that the energy producer 
countries need to diversify their economies away from energy. 
 
Thus, as mentioned before, concrete consensus definition of “energy security” can be 
hard to come by. As it is the case for security, “energy security” is also an evolving 
and subjective concept, changing in relation to historical and social context. For 
example, for Russia, as it is for OPEC, “energy security” means security of demand 
for its exports, and as long as continuity of demand is preserved, its primary position 
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as the supplier will be preserved. Moreover, Russia, in particular, aims to reassert 
state control over “strategic resources” and gain primacy over the pipelines and 
market channels through which it ships its hydrocarbons to international market 
(Yergin, 2006: 1). In a realist energy-dependent world system, keeping its energy 
supplier position will help Russia re-gain and preserve its relative power and 
security.  
 
On the other hand, for the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) “energy 
security” means security of reliable and affordable energy supply. However, even 
these two major powers have different security considerations. Whereas for Europe, 
the major debate revolves around how to manage the dependence on imported 
natural gas, overall imported energy-dependence is an important problem for the US, 
where the major debate centers on how to achieve energy self-sufficiency (Yergin, 
2006: 1).  
 
Realizing the evolving nature of it, Martin et al (1996: 4) observe three phases of 
development of the “energy security” concept. Accordingly, the first phase involves 
limiting vulnerabilities to disruptions rising from dependence on imported oil from 
an unstable Middle East. The longer-term, second phase, includes providing adequate 
supply for rising demand at reasonable prices, thus favoring the smooth overall 
functioning of the international energy system. And for the third facet of energy 
security, Martin et al (1996) mention energy-related environmental challenges and 
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declare the objective of this stage as forcing the international energy system to 
operate within the constraints of “sustainable development”.7  
 
In sum, “reliable, continuous supply of affordable prices” is the commonly described 
essence of the energy security, which is most appropriate from the consumer 
perspective. However, it should also be noted that the examined definitions do not 
give due consideration to environmental concerns. In this regard, the EU is the 
significant actor that has given relatively greater consideration to environmental 
concerns in its energy security definitions, as examined in detail below.  
 
 
2.3. Policies Needed to Secure Energy 
 
In order to secure energy, the most important step that needs to be taken by each 
party is to realize the futility of energy independence. Although it is a realist aim to 
be self-sufficient, it is obviously unrealistic. The increasing risks affecting reliable 
and secure supplies of energy have, however, prompted international actors to devise 
precautionary policies to reduce their existing levels of vulnerability. As suggested 
above, the earliest and most popular one of these policies is diversification. 
Increasing the number and variety of supply sources decreases the impact of 
disruption in supply from any one source and thus serves the interests of both 
consumer and producer, for who stable markets and security of demand is the prime 
                                                 
7 A development path along which the maximization of human well-being for today's generations does 
not lead to declines in future well-being (OECD, 2007). It is in a way to have a linkage between 
environment and development and this linkage was recognized globally in 1980 when the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature published the World Conservation Strategy and 
used the term "sustainable development”. 
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concern (Yergin, 2006: 3). However, as Bahgat (2006: 966) suggests, diversification 
is not just about diversifying imported supplies and supplier countries, it should also 
include the mix of primary energy sources. Thus, besides seeking alternative supply 
sources and diverse transportation routes, most imported energy-dependent 
consumers often try to create a balanced energy mix in their overall consumption, 
which often includes more internal energy sources or renewables.  
 
The second principle is resilience, which, in Yergin’s (2007: 3) words, involves a 
“security margin” in the energy supply system. This “security margin” is what allows 
for the provision of emergency supply in times of shocks and disruptions. According 
to Yergin (2007: 3), this objective can be achieved by various methods. Sufficient 
spare production capacity; strategic reserves; backup supplies of equipment; 
adequate storage capacity along the supply chain; the stockpiling of critical parts for 
electric power production and distribution and also ready response plans for 
disruptions that may affect large regions, are among those methods that can offer a 
greater security margin.8 The resilience principle is largely about available sources 
that are needed in times of crisis. Whereas diversification is essentially a long-term 
objective, resilience involves short-term security protection. That is, a larger number 
of sources, routes, or energy mixes covers a longer period, while a strategic reserve 
or spare capacity secures only a shorter period. Yet, at the end, both policies are 
necessary. 
 
                                                 
8 However, in Kalicki and Goldywn’s book, Yergin (2005: 55) mentions just two of these methods, 
spare production capacity and strategic reserves, as the two forms of “security margin”  and explain 
them in detail. In his definition, spare capacity is extra output that is higher than normal capacity and 
that can be put into production immediately,whereas strategic reserve is a form of insurance against 
major disruptions. 
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The third principle aims to increase cooperation among consumers, among producers 
or between both consumers and producers. Yergin (2007: 4) points to the importance 
of integration, in stating that there is only one market, but a large number of parties 
in this complex system. Bahgat (2006: 966) also highlights that enhanced reliability 
is needed among countries because they are bound to each other for many years. The 
cooperation principle also has a long-term dimension. Since it is impossible to go it 
alone in the energy market, both consumers and producers should pay great attention 
to establish reliable and long-term cooperation.  
 
Even, long-term agreements are preconditions rather than necessities for some 
cooperations such as natural-gas contracts, whereas it is not a necessity for the oil 
ones. This is largely because globalization of the gas market still requires expensive 
pipelines and LNG terminals. However, if long-term agreements are signed between 
parties for all types of energy, there will be stability in the market and the disruptions 
risks due to political reasons will be lessened. 
 
Moreover, the fourth and last of the suggested policies argued by Yergin (2007: 4) is 
promotion of high-quality information. Such information will help markets to 
function effectively. Since reality can be distorted and conspiracies arise, making 
situations more difficult to ascertain, high-quality and correct information is 
essential. According to Lesbirel (2004: 9), asymmetric information can cause over-
reactions to estimated market changes on both sides of the market and cause 
disruptions. Since any event can lead to a crisis and affect the entire energy market, 
great attention should be paid to high-quality information. 
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As a conclusion, it can be stated that there are many diverse policies to secure energy 
and preserve the energy market. Some of them have long-term effects whereas some 
has short-term effects. The important thing is not just to have one or two, it is to have 
a wider range of alternative options available.  
 
 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, it can be stated that security remains a difficult concept to define. Yet, 
it seems important to reduce the influence of Cold War and military factors in our 
conceptualizations of security. Energy should be a crucial new dimension of any 
post-Cold War definition of security. Due to the increasing importance of energy in 
all aspects of life and the political leverage inherent in the possession of energy 
because of limited sources of supply, energy has become closely linked up to 
security considerations.  
 
“Energy security” with its primary roots in major developed consuming countries has 
been defined as “security of reliable supply with affordable prices” and closely 
associated with such policies as diversification, resilient security margins, 
cooperation and high quality information. As will be shown beginning with the 
following chapter, the European Union, takes a consumer perspective on “energy 
security” and articulates its energy policies accordingly.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY SECURITY 
 
 
 
This chapter focuses on energy security in European Union (EU) discourse. It 
provides basic assumptions on how EU perceives energy security and what it 
proposes to overcome its members’ individual and collective energy challenges. The 
first part explains the background of “energy security” concept and its evolution. The 
main question that is addressed here is how has “energy security” increased in 
importance for the EU. The second part turns to a focus on “energy security” in EU 
discourse, showing how a series of green papers prepared by the Commission on 
energy have articulated the Community view on energy and proposed policies on 
energy. The main question to be addressed in this part concerns how the EU 
conceives of energy security  and whether this conceptualization is typical of major 
consumer countries or exhibits additional concerns that are more sui generis to the 
EU. 
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3.1. Background of EU’s “Energy Security” Perspective 
 
Starting with the 1973 oil crisis, continuing with the recurring problems arising from 
the Middle East, and lastly culminating in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute, energy 
security has emerged as a key focus in international relations. European Union is one 
of those actors whose members have experienced the negative impacts of these 
developments. Thus, it has begun giving more careful and explicit consideration to 
energy security. 
  
The historic event of a successful Arab oil embargo occurring at the end of 1973 and 
beginning of 1974, and the price shock of 1979 caused the Western European 
economics, and thus those of the future European Union, to experience 
unprecedented energy-related problems (Hoffman, 1985: xxiii). Particularly with the 
1973-1974 oil crisis, the Western Europe realized a need to limit imported energy. In 
time, European energy security considerations grew in importance and would 
gradually emerge as one of the top priorities of the European Union. 
 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo gave future European Union members three main 
concerns (Morelli, 2006: 3). First, it was realized that more collaboration was 
needed. Second, it became obvious that greater internalised coordination would be 
essential to manage supply disruptions and third, it was accepted that the EU needed 
strategies to avoid being victimized by energy-producing countries. There was 
recognition of the need for greater diversification. With these lessons taken from 
eventings originating in the Middle East, the EU shifted more of its energy-related 
business to Russia and other Eurasian nations (Morelli, 2006: 3). However, the 
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Russia-Ukraine gas dispute of 2006 and its consequences for the westward transport 
of gas supplies caused many to question whether Russia could continue to serve as a 
reliable partner of the EU. 
  
Today, the main energy-security problems of the EU are both internal and external 
(Belkin, 2007: 1). Internal ones include increasing energy prices, decreasing energy 
production in the EU, and a fragmented internal energy market. On the other hand, 
external factors include increasing world energy demand9, terrorist threats and 
perceptions of Russia’s intent to use energy as a source of political leverage (Belkin, 
2007: 1), much as Arab countries did in late 1973.  
 
Since 1950s, the Union has become less dependent on domestically produced energy 
source, coal and and became more dependent on imported sources (El- Agraa, 2001: 
297). By the time, it has grown highly dependent on imported energy. Union imports 
over 50% of its energy consumption, and, according to the Green Paper (European 
Commission, 2006: 3) import dependency is expected to rise to 70% over the next 
20-30 years. The Union’s internal energy reserves are relatively small and expensive 
to extract compared to external sources. On the basis of the 1997 data, the North Sea, 
whose reserves belong mainly to the United Kingdom, produced less than 5 % of 
world output, and its extracting costs were nearly four times those in the Middle 
East10 (European Commission, 2000: 18).  
                                                 
9 The world energy demand is increasing. “Particularly, growth in China and India has added 
significant levels of new demand for energy. Even in the energy rich region of the Middle East, 
growth in population along with economic modernization have resulted in a higher demand for 
energy. As living conditions and economies in Africa and Latin America continue to improve, the 
global demand for energy will increase.” (Morelli, 2006: 8) 
10 The cost of extracting one barrel of oil in Europe ranges between USD 7–11, compared to a range 
of USD 1–3 in the Middle East (European Commission, 2000: 18). 
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Moreover, the Union holds only 2% of total world natural gas reserves. The main EU 
natural gas producers, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, supplied just 12% 
of the Union’s natural gas demand (European Commission, 2000: 19). By 2005, 82% 
of oil and 58% of gas were being imported (Eurostat, 2007: 21). One third of 
imported oil comes from Russia, whereas 30,5% is from Middle East and 15,8 % is 
from Norway (European Commission, EU Energy in Figures 2007/2008, 2008: 14). 
Moreover, 42% of imported gas currently comes from Russia, 25,9 % from the 
Middle East and 24,2% from Norway (European Commission, EU Energy in Figures 
2007/2008, 2008: 14). When 1997 and 2007 period is examined, 8% decline in self 
sufficiency in oil consumption and 16% decline in Union sourced natural gas is 
examined (Tekin and Williams, forthcoming 2009: 341). In this context, in 
conjunction with the aforementioned dramatic events in the energy market, the EU 
needs to focus more attention to energy security and needs to take foreign-policy 
actions that are more active in addressing energy issues.  
 
 
 
3.2. Examination of EU Discourse on Energy Security through the Green 
Papers  
 
The Union has started to give more attention to energy security, but, with a growing 
number of members, some with very different views on the subject, has had to clarify 
the definition of energy security that it seeks to obtain. In the light of aforementioned 
challenges, it can be suggested that EU has complex energy security objectives, 
                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
24 
involving reasonable prices, reliable suppliers, diversified imports, diverse transit 
routes, and alternative internal resources. 
 
 According to the seminal Green Paper (1994:  5), energy security was originally 
articulated in general terms, as a policy 
…needed to manage policies to ensure the satisfaction of all users needs 
at the least cost while meeting the requirements of security of supply and 
environmental protection. 
 
 
As defined six years later in its Green Paper-Towards a European Strategy for the 
Security of Energy Supply- (2000: 4), energy security had become more specific: 
The European Union’s long-term strategy for energy supply security 
must be geared to ensuring, for the well-being of its citizens and the 
proper functioning of the economy, the uninterrupted physical 
availability of energy products on the market, at a price which is 
affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while respecting 
environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable development, as 
enshrined in Articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty on European Union. 
 
 
The energy security definition of the Commission can be taken as the most 
approximate official position of the Union and thus the best indicator of how the 
Union perceives “energy security”.  
 
Thus, it seems clear that, although the EU has a minimum energy-production 
capacity of its own, as does the United States, another large developed country in an 
analogous position, the EU’s definition of “energy security” largely fits into the 
consumer perspective.  That is, the European energy security definition also seems to 
involve affordable prices and continuous supply by reliable suppliers. However, the 
 
 
 
 
25 
Union maintains a uniquely salient concern for environmental considerations 
incorporating this concern into its very definition of “energy security,” at least as a 
parameter limiting the extent to which the EU is committed to pursuing security of 
supply alone.  
 
Nonetheless, in a basic sense, due to the various potential threats it faces to its 
economy (and with no unified command to address these threats using military 
tools), the EU still focuses on the classic consumerist concerns of continuity of 
sufficient energy supply at affordable prices together with reduction of imported 
energy dependency.  The Green Paper-centered EU discourse on energy security is 
examined in greater detail in the following section. 
 
 
3.2.1. European Green Papers on Energy and Energy Security 
 
Green Papers are documents published by the European Commission to galvanize 
discussion on expressed topics at the level of the European Union. These papers aim 
to make the relevant parties join in a process of consultation and debate on the 
identified topic. Green Papers are important in giving rise to legislative 
developments (Europa, 2007). 
 
On the energy issue, there have been five Green Papers published since 1994 
(Europa, European Union Documents, 2007): Green Paper-for a European Union 
Energy Policy (1994), Green Paper-Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of 
Energy (1996), Green Paper-Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
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Supply (2000), Green Paper on Energy Efficiency or Doing More with Less (2005) 
and Green Paper-A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure 
Energy (2006). These papers help to illuminate the European perspective on energy 
issues and energy security policies. This discussion will form the background for the 
next chapter on European common energy policies. 
 
 
3.2.1.1. The Green Paper-For  A European Union Energy Policy (1994) 
 
This is the first of the green papers published on energy. Initially, it declares the 
importance of energy. Then, after stating the significance of Europe’s dependence on 
imported energy and increasing world energy consumption, it focuses on the 
importance of security of supply and suggests policies to preserve and enhance it. 
 
According to the 1994 green paper, “energy is central to economic and social activity 
in the industrialized world” and the energy policy of the Union should be able to deal 
with the challenges surrounding energy and to ensure “diversity of national and 
regional energy portfolios for the overall benefit of the community” (European 
Commission, 1994: 4). 
 
According to estimates contained in the paper, although energy consumption of the 
Community was expected to grow slowly (1% a year), energy dependence was 
projected to increase from 50% to 70% by 2020 (European Commission, 1994: 13). 
On the other hand, community energy production was estimated to fall due to 
decreasing coal and oil production and slow growth in the role of renewables. 
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Thusly, the EU was expected to rely more on imports from third countries, mainly 
those in the Middle East, as well as Russia (European Commission, Green Paper, 
1994: 92); therefore, the need to give more consideration to security of supply was 
underlined. 
 
Security of supply was seminally defined by the Commission (1994: 22) as insurance 
of future essential energy needs and was to be attained by the “sharing of internal 
energy resources and strategic reserves under acceptable economic conditions and by 
making use of diversified and stable externally accessible sources” (European 
Commission, 1994: 22). The paper suggests that the concept encompasses “physical” 
security, economic security and continuity of supply and states that although there is 
a national dimension to securing energy supply, national measures should not be 
contrary to general or collective objectives (European Commission, 1994: 22). 
General community measures were needed to articulate the collective framework to 
determine optimal needed policies and objectives for the Union as a whole.  
 
 
 
In terms of Community competencies, the Commission states that, in order to 
achieve effectiveness and coherence, responsibilities are needed to be exercised 
through instruments. In this regard, two community policies are centrally important: 
the establishment of an internal energy market and the management of foreign policy 
on energy, focused on relations with third-country energy suppliers (European 
Commission, 1994: 13-14). However, it was important to qualify that Community 
competencies not influence national choices of fuel mix and do not permit any 
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discrimination against freedom of investment and free movement of energy services 
(European Commission, 1994: 32).  
 
This green paper lays out necessary measures to improve security of supply. It 
justifies the first set of measures, pertaining to the Union’s internal arrangements as 
needed to: create a climate favorable to corporate activity; increase efforts to save 
energy; to intensify efforts to utilize domestic energy resources in both economic and 
environmentally acceptable ways, especially in terms of renewable energy; and 
continue diversifying the sources and origins of Community supplies. 
 
Its second set of measures relates to external energy relations of the Union. For these, 
the green paper emphasizes the importance of strengthening the flexibility of the 
energy market via network interconnection and extending networks towards 
peripheral regions and production areas; strengthening the international cooperation 
between Community and its external suppliers and increasing energy cooperation 
with third countries, especially developing ones.  
 
Furthermore, the 1994 green paper focuses on the importance of: strengthening 
storage and other cooperative security measures addressed to supply interruptions; 
supporting major investments; and using energy more efficiently and more from 
domestic sources, which could also be categorized under internal measures 
(European Commission, 1994: 22). Accordingly, as there are some particularly 
important measures in order to secure supply of energy and as aforementioned 
framework, the Community was thought to require acting with significantly 
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enhanced competencies in order to draw the framework to determine the needed 
actions.  
 
Other than calling for a more detailed study on the security of supply and examining 
the supply situation vis-a-vis the main energy sources of the Community--coal, oil, 
natural gas and electricity, the Commission also underscored the salience of 
environmental protection, the necessity of efforts to decrease CO2 and the need to 
use energy sustainably and efficiently (European Commission, 1994: 23-25). .  
 
Thus, energy security emerged as an increasingly important consideration for the 
imported energy-dependent Union, specifically for the Commission, which took on a 
greater responsibility for drawing up framework for member states to achieve greater 
convergence in national objectives and policies, and thus, enhanced collective energy 
security. 
 
 
3.2.1.2. Green Paper-Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy 
(1996) 
 
As its title indicates, this green paper has a particular and unique focus on the 
importance of renewable energy sources. It declares EU objectives on renewables, 
and after identifying obstacles in the way of greater renewables use, suggests 
possible ways to overcome these obstacles (European Commission, 1996: 11).  
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This paper draws attention to the obvious fact that renewable energy is an 
underutilized source by EU countries. Renewable sources constituted 6% of the 
Union’s total energy consumption mix in 1996 (European Commission, 1996: 3).11 
Yet, the share should increase in order to reduce import dependence and to protect 
environment with reduced CO2 emission. The most significant obstacles in the way 
of the development of this resource are the high costs of its exploitation and the lack 
of confidence in investing in this sector (European Commission, 1996: 4). 
 
In order to overcome  these problems, the Commission suggests four policies, 
including delineating a common goal in terms of increasing the contributions of 
renewables, enhancing cooperation among member states, harmonizing member-
state policies on development of renewables, and strengthened monitoring of 
progress towards realizing these goals (European Commission, 1996: 5). It should be 
noted that, due to more recently emergent food scarcity concerns, the Union 
downgraded its efforts to increase the share of biofuels in overall energy 
consumption (Euractive, 2008).  
 
The paper underscores the multiple benefits of renewable sources. These contribute 
not only to decreased import dependency and environmental qualities, but also to 
competitiveness, employment and regional development of the Community 
(European Commission, 1996: 19). In terms of enhancing the competitiveness of the 
Union, the Commission suggests two advantages of using renewables (European 
                                                 
11Although, the Community use renewables with 6% percentage, there are some members states that 
use more,such as; Austria , Sweden, Finland, Portugal.They use respectively 24.1, 24.0, 19.3and 17.5 
renewables, whereas United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg and Netherlands have small renewable 
percentages, respectively 0.6, 0.8,1.3 and 1.4 (European Commission, 1996:12). 
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Commission, 1996: 21-23). First, when costs of other energy sources, such as 
nuclear, oil, gas, together with their impacts on the environment and reduced 
dependency on imports, are examined, it seems that using renewables may make 
their users more economically competitive. Second, according to Commission, price 
fluctuations on imported fuels do not affect the renewables’ prices and together with 
the increased opportunity for the export of renewable technologies, this stable price 
provides economic and competitive advantages for the Union. For example, 
Brazilian ethanol fuel programs can be exported as renewable technologies.12 
 
Moreover, the Commission emphasizes the advantages of renewables for regional 
development and employment. According to the Commission (1996: 23-24), many 
less developed regions have renewable energy production potential and the 
promotion of renewables in these areas will carry employment to these regions and 
will support small and medium size enterprises. According to the survey mentioned 
in the green paper, employment in the renewable sector is five times higher than in 
fossil fuels (European Commission, 1996: 23). Thus, besides contributing to 
independence and environmental qualities, it also has positive economic and 
developmental impacts. 
 
However, the Commission also notes the formidable obstacles to promoting 
renewables. One, renewables are costly (European Commission, 1996, 25). 
Furthermore, the investors seem averse to investing in renewable energy due to long-
term payoff periods and uncertainty about future market demand (European 
                                                 
12 Brazil obtains ethanol fuel from sugar and so produce cheaper and internal fuel. According to 
World Bank in 2006, Brazilian ethanol costs about $1 a gallon, whereas gasoline cost $1, 50 a gallon 
(Luhnow&Samor, 2006). 
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Commission, 1996: 26). Furthermore, unevenly distributed knowledge and problems 
arising from seasonality of production13 lessen its attractiveness. Nonexistent 
technical standards and the unwillingness of local residents to accept siting of 
renewable production in their areas also represent barriers to increased use of 
renewables. However with appropriate regulations and increased knowledge and 
education, renewables could become more widely and commonly used. 
 
In order to do this, as stated above, the Community needs to determine a consonant 
set of EU-wide goals. For example, there must be a percentage for the whole 
Community to attain (European Commission, 1996: 29). Moreover, according to 
Commission (1996: 30), there needs to be monitoring and assessment of situation, 
with the possibility of adjusting objectives. 
 
Thereafter, the policies should be implemented. It is better to have Community-level 
legislation, although industry, users and Member States have significant importance 
in the implementation of these policies (European Commission, 1996: 28). As most 
of the measures are taken by the Member States in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, effective direction is required from the Community in order to tighten 
cooperation between member states (European Commission, 1996: 28).  
 
The importance of coherent and effective community legislation and policies cannot 
be overemphasized. First of all, the Commission aims to create an internal energy 
market with renewable energy sources to occupy a prominent role therein (European 
                                                 
13 Particularly, for the wind and solar energy, the supply variability between day and night and seasons 
are significant problems, However, they can be solved by various methds, such temelatics applications 
and energy storage system (European Commission, Green Paper, 1996: 26) 
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Commission, 1996: 33). The Commission (1996: 34-38) proposes “renewable energy 
credits”14 ; internalization of cost and fiscal harmonization; state aid to promote 
renewables15; and lastly, determination of standard minimum requirements for 
renewable technologies. 
 
The Commission also advocates specific financial support for renewables, as in the 
1993 ALTENER programme, which aims to promote use of renewable energy 
sources (European Commission, 1996: 38). Furthermore, the Commission stresses 
greater support for research and development (European Commission, 1996: 39). It 
also favors promoting renewables in less developed regions (European Commission, 
1996: 42). The Commission (Green Paper, 1996: 44) also touches on the importance 
of renewables in agricultural policies. It states that, “the production of renewable 
energy sources represents a considerable potential for additional sources of income 
and reduction of CO2 emission in the agriculture and forestry sectors” (European 
Commission, 1996: 43).  
 
In addition, the Commission mentions the importance of renewables in the Union’s 
external relations (European Commission, 1996: 45). According to it, the 
Community should support the use of renewable energy usage in third countries, 
because this can moderate the demand for scarcer fossil fuels and thus extend the life 
of these more limited sources. On the other hand, increased usage of renewables in 
                                                 
14 “A certain percentage of a Member State’s electricity requirements will have to be met by 
renewables, enforced on each individual retail electric supplier” (European Commission, Green Paper, 
1996:35). By this way, the use of renewables is enforced by the Community. 
15 According to Commission information state aids include “national research and demonstration 
programmes; tax incentives; direct subsidies, low interest financing; development aid for small and 
medium sized enterprises active in renewables; lower VAT-rates for electricity based on renewables, 
state guaranteed interest loans, etc” (European Commission, 1996:36). 
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third countries will also enhanced the economic competitiveness of the Union, which 
will be enabled to sell renewable technologies to other countries, as Brazil does not 
with sugar cane-derived ethanol.  
 
As with the 1994 Green Paper, the 1996 documents also underlines the importance of 
energy security and advances internal and external policy proposals in order to deal 
with energy threats, such as a coherent internal legislation and increased relations 
with third countries.  Accordingly, it can be concluded that both green papers on 
energy published up to 2000 indicate rising imported energy dependency and the 
correspondingly enhanced need to pay attention to energy security. Yet, whereas the 
first one offers a general framework for dealing with dependency on energy imports, 
the subsequent one focuses more on the specific potential ameliorative role of 
renewables. Even the external policy suggestions in the latter paper focus on 
promotion of renewable energy in third countries, largely in the context of larger 
Union security objectives.  
 
 
3.2.1.3. Green Paper-Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply (2000) 
 
This Green Paper concentrates on the European energy security and the policies 
needed to enhance it. This paper, as in the 1994 document, reiterates the known facts 
about how the European Union is consuming more energy, and, since Community 
production is insufficient, how import dependency is rising and projected  to grown 
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from 50% to 70% in 20-30 years (European Commission, 2000: 2). It again uses this 
context to stress the need for concrete action plans. 
 
 According to Commission (2000: 2), in order to preserve energy security, the Union 
should aim to ensure the well-being of its citizens, the smooth functioning of the 
economy, availability of energy products in an undisrupted way at affordable prices 
and consideration for environmental quality and sustainable development (European 
Commission, 2000: 2). However, it is stated that the Commission (2000: 2) aims not 
to maximize energy efficiency and minimize dependence, but only to reduce the risks 
of dependence.  
 
According to Green Paper, energy demand is rising throughout the Community 
(European Commission, 2000: 14-16). Secondly, rising energy demand increases 
dependency on imports, but the EU lacks any common to free all of its members 
from dependency on certain single suppliers of particular energy sources (European 
Commission, 2000: 21-23). Thirdly, as imported energy passes through transit 
countries, the challenge of ensuring security of supply is complicated by the 
emergence of New Independent States (European Commission, 2000: 24). Fourthly, 
despite member state economies’ better capability of dealing with price volatility, the 
Community recognizes its inability to foresee geopolitical events and control world 
markets and the speculative forces that profit from these markets (European 
Commission, 2000: 27). As the last one, the Commission (2000: 80) states that if 
concrete target measures are not adopted, it is not possible to have environmental, 
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These aforementioned challenges have driven the evolution of the Commission’s 
energy security perception. More specifically, the Union moved from focusing on the 
challenges from increasing energy demand and increasing import dependency to 
addressing dependence on transit countries and volatile markets, all in an 
environmentally sustainable way.  
 
The Commission suggests new policies in Green Paper 2000. First of all, it suggests 
balancing supply and demand policies (European Commission, 2000:3). Second, it 
calls for concrete changes in consumer behavior via new taxation measures, penalties 
for environmentally harmful energy uses and new conservation and diversification 
policies, particularly for the transport and construction industries (European 
Commission, 2000: 3). On the other hand, it advocates revamping energy supply 
policies in order to reconcile rising energy needs with sometimes competing 
environmental, political, social, technical and economic objectives (European 
Commission, 2000: 80). Lastly, it again recommends developing new and renewable 
energy technologies, diversification, energy efficiency, conservation and greater 
decoupling of economic growth from energy consumption (European Commission, 
2000: 80). 
 
The 2000 Green Paper catalogues a host of energy security risks. One set stems from 
physical disruptions, which can occur permanently, when an energy source is 
exhausted or production is stopped, permanently or temporarily (European 
Commission, 2000: 64). The permanent ones can be addressed by product 
substitution, but temporary ones may be more disastrous for the economy (European 
Commission, 2000: 64). Economic risks stem from market price fluctuations 
 
 
 
 
37 
(European Commission, 2000: 64). Erratic fluctuations may also generate social 
risks, which may also occur due to instability in energy supplies caused by 
geopolitical factors, such as worsening relations with producers or sudden events 
(European Commission, 2000: 65). Finally, risks can be raised by damage to the 
environment from accidents and pollution (European Commission, 2000: 65). 
 
In this context, two main measures are proposed by the Commission (2000: 68-74): 
controlling the growth of demand and managing supply. On the former, two 
particular policies are proposed. The first one involves empowering horizontal 
policies aimed at finalizing the internal market, particularly in gas and electricity; 
using energy taxes to improve efficiency; adopting energy-saving schemes and 
developing new technologies (European Commission, 2000: 14-16). The second 
addresses sectoral policies in order to incentivized greater use of rail, water and and 
public modes of transportation and to generate more energy savings in buildings 
(European Commission, 2000: 70). 
 
In terms of managing supply, the Commission proposes three main measures to 
reduce dependence. The first one focuses on augmenting internal supplies (European 
Commission, 2000: 71). In this context, it suggests development of less polluting 
energy sources, such as renewables and nuclear energy, and preservation of access to 
strategic resources (European Commission, 2000: 71-72). The second measure 
focuses on maintaining competition and suggests a greater role for the Commission 
in tightening competition rules (European Commission, 2000: 72). Finally, the 
Commission targets the securing of external supplies (European Commission, 2000: 
73). If the Union cannot reduce dependency, it will continue to face vulnerability to 
 
 
 
 
38 
external supply volatility. It emphasizes that the Community should leverage its 
political and economic power to guarantee flexible and reliable external supply from 
producer countries through existing supply networks (European Commission, 2000: 
73-74). 
 
More specifically, as for its external relations, the 2000 paper indicates that the 
Union needs to continue dialogue with producer countries, which will promote the 
improvement of price mechanisms, the reaching of agreements and the use of reserve 
stocks for common benefit (European Commission, 2000: 73). The dialogue should 
broadly include all matters of common interest, even the environment and 
technology transfer (European Commission, 2000: 74). On the other hand, since it is 
recognized as being just as important as guaranteeing the basic pricing and duration-
related details of supply from producer, energy transit should be ensured with long-
term agreements and improved relations with suppliers. Therefore, construction of 
new oil and gas pipelines is needed in order to bring new energy supplies from places 
like the Caspian Basin and Mediterranean and better grid facilities are needed for 
transboundary electricity transactions (European Commission, 2000: 73). 
 
Compared to the previous two papers, Green Paper 2000 is closer to the 1994 one. 
Whereas the 1996 document had a specific focus, the 1994 and 2000 papers offer a 
more general framework. When compared to the document of 1996, however, Green 
Paper 2000 takes any even broader approach to what is needed for improved EU 
energy security. As such, it represents an improved instrument to help the Union to 
deal with energy security challenges, particularly energy dependency. 
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3.2.1.4. Green Paper- On Energy Efficiency or Doing More with Less (2005) 
 
As is obvious from the name, this green paper focuses on promotion of energy 
efficiency. As the paper relates, beginning with the 1973 oil embargo, Community 
members started to think about reducing energy consumption in order to be less 
dependent on oil. Thereafter, because of the increased use of cars, higher use of 
energy in buildings and rising energy prices, reducing energy consumption in a cost 
effective manner became a central challenge for many import-energy dependent 
states (European Commission, 2005: 12). According to the green paper (European 
Commission, 2005: 4), the Commission aims to save 20% of Community energy 
consumption. Commission believes that this conservation will also contribute to 
Community’s competitiveness and employment while preserving the environment. 
On the other hand, reflecting the evolution of EU-level thought and discourse, the 
Commission (2005: 5) points out that energy efficiency will also contribute directly 
to security of supply.  
 
As a first step, the Commission (2005: 13) suggests improvement of the regulatory 
regime by introduction of greater market transparency. Moreover, it underlines the 
importance of financial instruments and energy services in increasing energy 
efficiency (European Commission, 2005: 14). Moreover, greater action by public 
authorities, national or EU, should also be realized and consumer consciousness 
raised, by means of regulated price changes. The thinking behind this proposal is 
that, if the prices paid for consumed energy reflect all externalities, like pollution or 
even the risk of being dependent on unstable or unreliable external suppliers, they 
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can be incentivized to use energy more efficiently (European Commission, 2005: 
14). Consumer consciousness also involves information and education, not merely 
the use of official tax and pricing incentives. However, the Commission (2005: 16) 
does not suggest information and education merely for consumers, but also for 
industrial customers, energy efficiency experts and service providers.  
 
Since the responsibility of the Union is not clearly stated in this area, the green paper 
expresses the urgency of a concrete Action Plan (European Commission, 2005: 16). 
According to the European Commission (2005: 16-17), an Action Plan is necessary 
in order to activate all the players, including national governments, regions, 
municipalities, industries and individuals, covering all energy producing and 
consuming sectors and players. 
 
In this context, the Community indicates that it should place energy efficiency at the 
core of its concerns and embed it within other Community policies (European 
Commission, 2005: 17). In order to be successful in this integration, firstly, research 
and development should be supported and all best practices and technologies should 
be promoted. Even particular national Action Plans should be developed in order to 
promote best practice at all levels (European Commission, 2005: 17-18). Better use 
of taxation and state aids16 are also advised (European Commission, 2005: 18-20). 
Public purchasing should consider energy efficiency goals. More energy-efficient 
products should be chosen (European Commission, 2005: 20). Furthermore, as was 
the case for renewables, more investment should be made to improve energy 
                                                 
16 The state aids are needed to be in favor of energy efficiency and in accordance with Community 
proposals on environmental protection (European Commission, 2005: 20). 
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efficiency by means of support given in European financing framework (European 
Commission, 2005:20-21). As a second aim of attaining Community action on 
energy efficiency, the Commission (2005: 21) states the importance of specific 
energy policy measures. These measures focus on buildings, domestic appliances of 
energy efficiency policies by Member States, limiting the fuel consumption of 
vehicles and consumer awareness raising (European Commission, 2005: 21-24). 
 
On the other hand, besides Community level regulations, the Commission (2005: 25) 
focuses on the importance of national level regulations, even to the point of stating 
that national level regulations are more appropriate to encourage energy efficiency. 
For national level regulations, the Green Paper (1995: 25-28) stresses regulation of 
network activities, regulation of supply activities, electricity generation17 and white 
certificates18. However, the Commission (2005: 32-33) suggests that Community and 
national measures can be effective if only they can be implemented locally. 
Therefore, regional and local measures are to be encouraged by specific financing 
measures (European Commission, 2005: 32). 
 
Moreover, energy efficiency has an international dimension, that is, every import 
dependent country aims to reduce its dependency, an objective that can be facilitated 
by achieving gains in energy efficiency. According to the European Commission 
                                                 
17 For the electricity generation, promotion of distributed generation and co-generation are particularly 
emphasized (European Commission,2005:27-28) 
18 “White certificate systems have been partially implemented in Italy and the UK, are under 
preparation in France, and are being considered in the Netherlands. These are systems where suppliers 
or distributors are obliged to undertake energy efficiency measures for final users. Certificates 
corroborate the amount saved, giving both energy value and lifetime. Such certificates can, in 
principle, be exchanged and traded. If the contracted parties cannot then submit their allocated share 
of certificates, they can be required to pay fines that may exceed the estimated market value” 
(European Commission, 2005:28). 
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(2005: 33), energy efficiency is central to European cooperation with third countries. 
Besides the geopolitical and strategic significance of energy efficiency, it is expected 
to enhance the competitiveness of EU products. As an energy efficiency leader in the 
contemporary era, the Union can export its knowledge and thus exploit new 
opportunities for its industries (European Commission, 2005: 34). First of all, the 
Commission (2005: 34) suggests that energy efficiency should be integrated into its 
international cooperation. Secondly, it suggests factoring energy efficiency into the 
Neighborhood Policy and EU-Russia cooperation (European Commission, 2005: 35). 
Thirdly, the Commission (2005: 35) suggests making energy efficiency part of its 
development policy. Lastly, it advices backing efforts by International Financing 
Institutions to incorporate energy efficiency into their technical assistance to third 
countries (European Commission, 2005: 35-36).  
 
As was the case for the 1996 Green Paper on Renewables, this paper also adopts a 
specific focus on enhancing energy security through another largely internally 
generated measure, enhanced energy efficiency, which can nonetheless be externally 
applied as well. Different from the 1994 and the 2000 green papers, this one 
specifically focuses on the specific importance of energy efficiency and on ways to 
bring it about. As with the 1996 Green Paper, in the 2005 document, even external 
relations are examined in terms of how they can be promoted by internally-focused 
objectives and measures over which the Union has theoretically greater policy and 
political control. 
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3.2.1.5. The Green Paper- Towards a European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy (2006)  
 
Like its predecessors, this Green Paper starts by clarifying the energy security 
challenges facing the Union before proceeding to suggestions and options. These 
suggestions and options form the basis for a new comprehensive European Energy 
Policy to meet three core objectives of energy policy, sustainable development, 
competitiveness and security of supply (European Commission, 2006: 4). 
 
In order to indicate where priority action is needed, the Commission identified six 
priority areas in the Green Paper. The first area is discussed under the heading 
“energy for growth and jobs in Europe: completing the internal European electricity 
and gas markets.”  In this area, open markets are deemed necessary in order to help 
Europ to overcome its energy problems. A truly competitive single European 
electricity and gas market is identified as central to bringing prices down, improving 
security of supply and enhancing industrial competitiveness (European Commission, 
2006: 5). Within the first priority area, some necessary actions are clarified in order 
to complete the internal energy market. These can be listed as developing a European 
energy grid code; proceeding with a priority European interconnection plan; 
increasing investment in generation capacity; advancing new initiatives to ensure a 
level of playing field, particularly regarding the unbundling of networks from 
competitive activities; and boosting competitiveness (European Commission, 2006: 
6-7). 
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This green paper discusses the second priority area under the title of “an internal 
energy market that guarantees security of supply ensuring solidarity between 
member states.” This priority area focuses on two main objectives, the first being to 
enhance security of supply in the internal market and the second being to rethink the 
EU’s approach to emergency oil and gas stocks available to prevent disruptions. In 
order to achieve these objectives it is proposed to have a European Energy Supply 
Observatory; improved network security; a mechanism for solidaristic responses; 
common standards to protect infrastructure; and revision of Community legislation 
on oil and gas stocks (European Commission, 2006: 8-9). 
 
The third priority area consists of more sustainable and efficient diverse energy mix. 
Thus, the freedom of each member state and company to choose its preferred energy 
mix is permitted; however, it is also stressed that the choices of each member state 
impact the energy security of its neighbors and of the Community as a whole. 
 
In this respect, a Strategic EU Energy Review is identified as essential. This review 
proposal would offer a uniform framework for taking national decisions on energy 
mix, covering all aspects of energy policy and analyzing the full cost-benefit ratios of 
each different energy source (European Commission, 2006: 9). As a result, it may 
generate pressure for agreement on overall Community-level strategic objectives and 
the appropriate balancing of the goals of sustainable energy use, competitiveness and 
security of supply, and most prominently, preserving the right of Member States to 
make their own energy choices (European Commission, 2006: 9-10). 
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In terms of the fourth priority area, the Green Paper suggests a series of measures to 
address climate change. Energy efficiency and increasing use of renewables form the 
core of the Commission’s suggestions in this area. In addition, the Commission gives 
substantive content to an Action Plan on energy efficiency to be adopted by the end 
of that year, effectively incorporating the proposals articulated by the 2005 Green 
Paper. The Action plan proposes concrete measures to save 20% of the energy that it 
would otherwise consume by 2020. Additionally, the Commission declares that it 
will prepare a Renewable Energy Road Map and suggests that the carbon capture and 
geological storage are alternative options for tackling climate change, particularly for 
those member countries that choose to continue use of coal (European Commission, 
2006: 10-12). 
 
Later, the Commission also declares that development and deployment of new 
energy technologies are also significant in providing security of supply, sustainability 
and industrial competitiveness. Commission also states that, in order to achieve the 
aforementioned objectives, a strategic energy technology plan is needed by the 
Union (European Commission, 2006: 13-14). This plan will ensure European 
industries remaining the world leaders in the generation of new technologies 
(European Union, 2006). 
  
Finally, the Commission emphasizes the importance of common external energy 
policy. It states that, faced with certain energy challenges, Europe needs a coherent 
external policy in order to be more effective in the international arena and to tackle 
common problems together with energy partners. In order to achieve the 
aforementioned aims, the Union needs to adopt a common vision and speak with 
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single voice on the international scene. The Strategic EU Energy Review is expected 
to establish a framework for the common vision and to constitute an action plan for 
the European Council to monitor progress and identify new challenges (European 
Commission, 2006: 14).  
 
In addition, the Commission proposes a number of key goals and instruments: 
developing a clear policy on securing and diversifying energy supplies; sustaining 
energy partnership with producers, transit countries and other international actors; 
increasing dialogue with major energy producers and suppliers; developing a pan 
European Energy Community; reacting effectively to external crisis situation; 
integrating energy into other policies with an external dimension; and using energy 
to promote development  (European Commission, 2006: 15-17). 
 
Like its 1994 and 2000 versions, Green Paper 2006 also focuses more broadly on 
enhancing energy security, not just by pursuing specific ends like increased usage of 
renewables or energy efficiency. Thus, the Green Paper 2006 is also a more 
comprehensive road map for the Union to reach enhanced energy security.  By way 
of conclusion, it can be stated that all five Green Papers on energy prepared by the 
European Commission since 1994, albeit reflecting the perceived salient necessities 
of their respective time periods, have a common aim of reducing the risks and 
vulnerabilities entailed in growing EU dependency on imported energy. Moreover, 
whether these are addressed as primary, secondary or tertiary topics, all green papers 
underscore the importance of internal measures, particularly renewables, energy 
efficiency and more coherent EU-level policy. It is important to note that, common 
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energy policy and improved EU-level decision-making have become predominant 
Commission foci. 
 
 
3.3. Conclusion: 
 
In this chapter, a brief analysis of energy security in European discourse was made 
using the Green Papers on energy. No less that any other import -dependent energy 
consuming economies, the EU aims to secure its energy supply. Past experiences 
have certainly made the Union more anxious and more urgently focused on 
developing coherent and unified internal and external energy policies, as articulated 
in the most recent Green Paper of 2006. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the Commission has realized the necessity, if not the 
means, of promoting a common EU energy policy. Although there have been 
prototypical efforts to develop common energy policy, as in the establishment of 
Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, the need for a more comprehensive 
common energy policy was never felt until much more recently, as global 
interdependence and EU dependency on foreign energy suppliers has increased so 
dramatically. Additionally, common energy policy is an endeavor reflective of the 
perception that integration in other sectors led to more economic success. In this 
respect, the Union has sought to develop a more integrated energy security policy 
and to take more unified stances in the international arena.  
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 
EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY POLICY 
 
 
 
The increased security considerations of the Union on energy related issues made the 
Union more desirous of having policies to deal with energy security challenges. 
Specifically, efforts on integrated common energy policies have accelerated. This 
chapter examines European energy security policies. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, the common energy policy efforts of the Union will 
be examined in historical context vis-a-vis changing energy security challenges. In 
the second section, internal energy policies will be studied. Although, this second 
part is a similar study to chapter 3, it includes  more specific study of stated internal  
energy policies. In this context, this part focuses on three green papers which has 
more concrete internal energy proposals; Green Paper- For A European Energy 
Policy (1994), Green Paper- Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy 
Supply (2000) and Green Paper- Towards a European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy (2006). 
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Finally,  the external energy policy of the Union will be assessed . After delineating 
the external policy objectives of the Union, the Union’s corresponding relations with 
major and alternative energy suppliers, Russia, Middle East, Norway and Caspian 
region countries will be examined . 
 
 
4.1. Development of Common Energy Policy of the EU 
 
Although the genesis of the EU, going back to the 1951 European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) and the Euratom treaty of 1957, was in fact energy-related in 
large part, the European Community Treaty still lacks general competencies with 
respect to EU energy policy (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 4). A common energy 
policy has not yet been attained, so energy policy still resides largely under the 
respective purviews of individual EU Member States. Yet, clear efforts to obtain a 
coherent policy have been underway, if never actually reaching full fruition, for a 
long time. 
 
The European Energy Policy was initiated with the ECSC, the seminal phase of the 
European Union (EU), and extended via the common policies established for the 
Euratom (Ege et al. 2004: 10).19 Since the 1950s, commencing with coal, measurable 
                                                 
19 The 1951 Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community and the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome establishing Euratom were dedicated to the coal and nuclear sectors. The 1951 ECSC Treaty 
made clear that coal is dominant in the energy balance of member states and  by  tackling coal most 
EC energy supply and demand issues were mentioned. On the other hand, the 1957, Euartom Treaty 
aimed to increase cooperation for the development of nuclear power, and suggested nuclear power as 
the main source of future energy requirements. Both of the treaties, were in principle, led towards the 
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effort has taken place in order to obtain a common policy for the broader energy 
sector. Then, following the foundation of these new communities, a common energy 
market was first attempted in 1959. Then, after 1960, efforts increased to have a 
more stable energy policy.  
 
First effort to have a regular energy policy was observed in 1962, with the 
preparation of an energy policy memorandum by the Commission. Then in 1964, 
member states reached an agreement and signed a protocol on energy problems. 
Later, in 1968, the Commission accelerated initiatives on energy and established a 
directive on energy, stating that “each member state has to have a minimum petrol 
stock” (Ege et al. 204: 13). 
 
 By this time, due to rising concerns over energy security after the 1967 Arab oil 
embargo and due to changing energy security perceptions, the importance of having 
a common energy policy became more obvious (Canbolat, 2002: 208). Particularly, 
the oil crisis of 1970s led to fundamental shifts in the concerns of the member states 
for energy security and future Union energy policy. The 1973 oil embargo 
highlighted the EU need to diversify its source of energy supplies in order to reduce 
its level of dependence on any one area of the energy world. In 1988, the initial step 
on developing an Internal Energy Market (IEM) was taken, but the IEM was actually 
launched by means of a four-directive package in 1989 and internationalized in the 
form of the European Energy Charter (Matlary, 1997: 21). Despite the oppositions 
                                                                                                                                          
creation of free and integrated markets in the energy sector (El-Algraa et al. 2001: 296). Both of the 
treaties has the plan that integration in the energy sector would lead to further political integration 
(Matlary, 1997: 16) 
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from energy-sector interests and governments20, work on the IEM proceeded from 
1988 to 1995. The Union launched an initiative to promote energy cooperation 
among member states and to diversify energy supply as part of the 1991 Energy 
Charter Declaration (Morelli et al. 2007: 3). This led to the Energy Charter Treaty, 
which was signed in 1994 and entered into force in 1998.21 The Energy Charter 
Treaty has since been signed by 51 nations in addition to the EU (Morelli et al. 2007: 
3).  
 
Since the signing of the Energy Charter Treaty, EU tried to develop a coordinated 
approach to energy policy and security. Significantly, the Commission has tried to 
shape a European energy policy by exercising its responsibility on the internal gas 
and electricity market, encouraging the development of alternative supplies and 
trying to establish more collaborative external relations with current and possible 
energy suppliers (Morelli et al. 2007: 4).  The 1995 White Paper combined all 
competencies attributable to the Community in all three energy-related treaties and in 
the European Union Treaty. By doing this, it was decided that if any policy is 
perceived as an obstacle in the way of EU goals, EU-level policies will take priority 
to national level policies (Oktay et al 2006: 161). Furthermore, the 1994 Green Paper 
stated that the IEM is needed in order to develop a security of supply policy and to 
integrate the environmental criteria into energy policy. Yet, at the end, it did not lay 
out a supranational role for the Commission (Matlary, 1997: 63). 
                                                 
20 Although, governements knew the advantages of the IEM,  due to the fear to loose national control 
over energy policy , they  opposed a complete IEM.(Matlary, 1997:21) 
21 “The aim of the Charter is to promote an efficient energy market through the price mechanism, with 
due attention being paid to the environment” (Matlary, 1997:54). On the other hand , McGowan 
(1996:177) suggests that the Charter is a strategic initiative based on West’s interests in order to 
ensure secure and increasing supplies of gas and oil from the East, and the interets of East in 
protecting large flows of investment capital, hard currency earnings and key technologies of West. 
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Despite the efforts mentioned above, there was still need for more a coordinated 
energy policy. Particularly, Germany’s inattention to, or disregard for, the energy and 
security needs of the Baltic States and Poland in the bilateral agreement that it signed 
with Russia in 2005 and in the Russia-Ukraine dispute, made the necessity of 
coordinated external energy policy more obvious. These development led to 
questioning of long-term security of energy supply and the member states  
recognized that EU needs to diversify its sources of supply and to develop both a  
broad common internal energy policy and an external energy strategy. Following the 
Russian-Ukraine gas crisis, EU Energy Commissioner Piebalgs stated that Europe 
needs “a more cohesive policy on security of energy supply” (Morelli, 2006: 5). 
Then, the 2006 Green Paper stated the importance of these necessities more clearly 
and laid out the policy options for a common European energy policy (Morelli, 2006: 
summary). 
 
Yet, in the end, the Union still lacks a common energy policy. Energy policy in 
Europe is still largely a national prerogative and although most member states have 
similar problems and challenges, national policies diverge in important ways 
(McGowan, 1996: 17). Viewing energy as a national concern and fearing loss of 
sovereignty over this vital policy interest, member states are still reluctant to cede 
national control over energy. 
 
Due to differences in territorial possession of various natural resources, structures of 
energy sectors, political choices, security considerations and interests of each 
member state, it is difficult to achieve a common energy policy. As Commission 
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President Barroso indicated, “the Union has the required size and required 
instruments but it lacks the political will to forge a common European energy policy” 
(Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 11). Yet, this does not erode the internal and external 
energy policy necessities of the Union and the efforts of the Commission to reach a 
common energy policy. 
 
 
4.2. Internal Energy Policy of the EU 
 
Since there is no clear and coherent energy policy regulation of the Union, the Green 
Papers on energy, particularly the ones about internal policy of the Union, will be 
cited to demonstrate the Commission’s attitude on energy policy. The Green Paper-
For a European Union Energy Policy (1994), the Green Paper- Towards a European 
Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply (2000) and Green Paper- A European 
Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy (2006) are significant green 
papers in order to understand the Unions’s proposals on internal energy policy. As 
aforementioned, this part is similar to the third chapter; however it will be a more 
detailed study in order to understand the internal energy policy of the Union. 
 
The Green Paper 2006 is a particularly useful guide to understanding the Union’s 
internal policy. Its clear analysis, grouped under five headings (excluding the sixth 
one, which deals with external policy), covers all necessary EU policies needed to 
understand the EU approach to internal energy policy. This green paper, with its 
basic objectives of sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply, also 
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exhibits the main aims of EU’s internal energy policy. In this regard, the Green Paper 
2006 will be the main guideline of this part. 
 
As mentioned in the Green Paper 2006, the internal energy policy of the Union aims 
to achieve sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply. In order to attain 
these aims, the first priority area of the Union is completing the internal European 
electricity and gas markets. With the Commission’s (2006: 5) words, a truly 
competitive single European electricity and gas market is necessary to bring prices 
down, improve security of supply and increase competitiveness. According to Green 
Paper 2006, in order to achieve a fully integrated market, the Union should regard 
preferred supplier and attitudes towards market liberalization as key structural 
problems other than the obvious fact of national differences in energy mix. Actions 
are needed for development of a European energy grid, enhancing the 
interconnection plan, investment in generation capacity to ensure a level playing 
field and achieving a more significant unbundling of networks, and boosting the 
competitiveness of European investment (European Commission, 2006: 6-7). 
 
Going back in time, Green Paper 2000 also pointed out the importance of an 
integrated European energy market.  It mentions the integrated European energy 
market as one of two challenges of the EU and in order to overcome this challenge, 
suggests achieving a fully working internal market.  For Green Paper 2000, as in 
2006, the main point is to create cooperation between internal parties, which can be 
achieved by defining a European plan for enhancing internal infrastructure 
(European Commission, 2000: 60). 
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For this to happen, the Commission suggests to have an advisory body. According to 
Commission, the advisory body is aimed at influencing all national regulations in 
order to assist the Commission in the proper functioning of the internal market 
(European Commission, 2000: 61).  As Green Paper 2006 does, Green Paper 2000 
supports creation of new interconnection infrastructure.  
 
However, from the perspective of the 1994 Green Paper, it can be seen that the 
aforementioned propositions are not new. The Green Paper 1994 also mentioned the 
importance of establishing an internal energy market. The Commission also states in 
1994 that, general community measures are needed to construct a framework to 
determine the necessary policies and objectives. It also focuses on the importance of 
cooperation between regulatory authorities and network managers, development of 
interconnections and need for harmonization (European Commission, 1994: 33-34). 
The Green Paper 1994 also signifies the importance of creating the needed climate 
for economic investment. 
 
The Green Paper 2006 laid out the second priority area as establishment of an 
Internal Energy Market that guarantee security of supply and solidarity between 
member states. Although this priority area seems similar to the first one, its concrete 
focus is to enhance security of supply in the internal market and to rethink the EU’s 
approach to emergency oil and gas stocks available to prevent disruptions. With this 
second priority area, the Commission suggests having a European energy supply 
observatory that can monitor demand and supply patterns and alert members of 
shortfalls in infrastructure and supply (European Commission, 2006: 8). The main 
aim here is to improve network security; develop mechanisms to prepare and ensure 
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solidarity; protect infrastructure and make revisions to existing Community 
legislation on oil and gas (European Commission, 2006: 8-9). 
 
On the other hand, in order to guarantee security of supply, Green Paper 2000 also 
suggests the importance of controlling demand. Besides consistent policy on oil and 
gas stocks that will reduce the risks related on supply dependence, Green Paper 2000 
points out the importance of controlling demand growth. Taxation, legislated energy 
saving schemes and development of new technologies are proposed as methods of 
curtailing demand.  
 
Even earlier in time, Green Paper 1994 also states the importance of security of 
supply and solidarity among member states and the corollary need to strengthen the 
storage and cooperative security measures aiming to cope with supply interruptions 
(European Commission, 1994: 22). 
 
The third priority area of the Green Paper 2006 is to have more sustainable, efficient 
and diverse energy mix, by which decreased dependency on foreign supply will also 
be attained (European Commission, 2006: 9). As constantly declared, member states 
are left free to choose their energy mix, but should take into account that choices of 
each have impact on energy security of its neigbors and of the Community as a 
whole.  
 
 According to Green Paper 2006, freedom of member states to choose their energy 
mix should be balanced with by need of the Union as a whole to have a diverse 
energy mix that meets its core energy objectives (European Commission, 2006: 9-
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10). What is needed is to determine the energy sources that lead to sustainability and 
security, to improve the internal availability of those that contribute to sustainable 
development. Afterwards, the member states should select their own energy mix 
among the energy sources that are consonant with the general energy objectives of 
the Union. Similarly, the Green Paper 1994 suggests intensifying efforts in order to 
improve domestic energy resources in both economically and environmentally 
acceptable ways (European Commission, 1994: 22). For this Green Paper, it is 
important to diversify sources and origins of Community supplies, particularly by 
using more renewable energy sources (European Commission, 1994: 22). 
 
Actually, renewable sources the most often cited energy source in order to attain 
sustainability and security, not only in the 1996 paper devoted to these sources of 
energy. Green Paper 2000 also mentions the significance of renewables. The 
Commission (2000: 42) even named the renewable energy sources in the Green 
Paper 2000 as “political priorities” due to its mentioned importance in sustainability 
and security. Since renewables contribute to indigenous means of energy production, 
they by implication lead to diversification and thus security of supply. Moreover, 
since the renewables have zero or low carbon emission levels, they contribute to a 
more environmentally sustainable form of diversification. Among the renewable 
sources such as hydroelectricity, biofuels, wind energy, solar power and geothermal, 
biofuels are targeted as a significant alternative in the fuel market (European 
Commission, 2000: 44). 
 
Conversely, there are energy sources that also promote diversification, such as 
nuclear energy and coal. Yet they are called as “undesirables” due to their heavily 
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negative connotations (European Commission, 2000: 31). Although it has minimal 
carbon emissions, nuclear energy is not preferred due to its suggested health risks 
and environmental damages. On the other hand, due to cheaper prices of imports 
(relative to its domestic production cost) and the flexibility of contracts, indigenous 
coal is not a preferred energy source. The pollution generated by coal at every stage 
of production and utilization is undesirable (European Commission, 2000: 35). 
 
Every energy source has advantages and drawbacks. Even the highly preferred 
energy sources, oil and natural gas, are not desirable in terms of their largely external 
supply origins (for EU members). What is important for the Union is to make the 
member states choose their own energy mix, which for some, do involve nuclear and 
coal. However, the Commission wants them to consider the Union’s larger objectives 
on energy, such as sustainability and security, in their energy mix choices. 
 
The fourth priority area thus involves the objectives of sustainability and security. It 
focuses on the necessity of an integrated approach to tackle climate change. In this 
context, energy efficieny and increased usage of renewables are the main proposals 
addresses to climate change. For energy efficiency, the Commission suggests long 
term campaigns with the target of increased energy efficiency in buildings and 
transport sector, which needs more investment. 
 
In terms of energy efficiency, the Green Paper 2000 identifies transport as an 
obvious priority goal. According to Commission proposals in this paper, the 
imbalance between roads, railways and seaborne modes of transport is significant. 
The highest oil-consuming and CO2-emitting form of transportation, the highway, 
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should be counterbalanced by greater emphasis on rail and sea transport. According 
to Green Paper 2000, there is need for revitalization of railways, development of 
short sea shipping and inland waterways, together with reorganization of road 
transport and increased urban transportation (European Commission, 2000: 71). 
Furthermore, the Green Paper 2000 identifies a need to make users more concious 
about energy consumption in order to control demand. Assuming that it is hard to 
make everyone conscious, it suggests ways to control demand such as taxation, 
legislation, energy-saving schemes and development of new technologies. These can 
be also be termedenergy efficiency efforts directed at climate change, for which the 
Green Paper 1994 also suggests legislation at the community level. 
 
The fifth and the last priority area in the Green Paper 2006 concerning the Union’s 
internal energy policy is creation of a strategic European energy technology plan in 
order to attain most of the aforementioned priorities. According to the Commission, 
development and deployment of new energy technologies can help to provide 
security of supply, sustainability and industrial competitiveness. The development of 
new technologies will also help the EU to achieve energy efficiency and low carbon 
emission. The Green Paper 2000 also declares the need for development of new 
technologies as one of the most effective instruments for controlling demand, while 
the Green Paper 1994 also stresses the importance of technology. 
 
Thusly, it can be concluded that there is not a clear set of EU energy policies that are 
applied to every member state. By looking the green papers published by the 
Commission on energy, particularly the ones published in 1994, 2000 and 2006, a 
general assumption can be made about the Union’s internal energy policy approach. 
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The latest green paper on energy, published in 2006, specified five priority area of 
the Union about the internal energy policy in order to attain its primary objectives.  
All the priority areas are similar at some point because all are needed to attain same 
objectives: sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. The member states 
are free in their energy mix preferences and there are no clear mandates in European 
internal energy policy. But the important point is to make every consumer in the 
Union and every member state conscious of energy policy objectives and priorities of 
the Union as a whole and to balance their preferences with the Union’s. However, in 
order to attain the aforementioned objectives, it is also needed to balance internal 
policies with the external ones. 
 
 
4.3. External Energy Policy of the EU 
 
Being in need of reliable, affordable and sustainable flow of energy, and being 
dependent on imports from unstable regions and suppliers, the EU is expected by the 
Commission to give weight to energy policies in all their aspects, internal and 
external. To have all necessary internal regulations and policies is not enough if these 
are not complemented by the required external policies. The important point is to 
realize that coherence is central to achieve Union objectives: “There should be 
coherence between the internal and external aspects of energy policy and between 
energy policy and other policies that affect it” (Communication from the 
Commission to the European Council, 2006: 2).  
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The Green Paper 2006 also makes it obvious that a coherent external energy policy is 
crucial to ensuring energy security, with the European Council supporting the 
Commission’s arguments and suggesting that a coherent and focused external EU 
energy policy would enhance the collective external energy security of the Union 
(Paper from Commission/SG/HR for the European Council, 2006:1).  
 
EU external relations director general, Eneko Landaburu (2007: 3) has stated that 
there is an ongoing effort in the Commission to improve Union energy relations with 
its main external energy partners, whether producers or transit countries. With its 
increasing dependency on energy imports, the Union needs more focused and 
coherent external energy policies (Landaburu, 2007: 3). 
 
In this respect, the initial step should be to determine external energy policy 
objectives and priorities. The main objective of the external energy policy, as 
declared in the Green Paper 2006, is to guarantee security supply, ensure 
sustainability and enhance competitiveness. In this respect, it needs to speak with one 
voice, to enhance member-state coordination to achieve a coherent, focused and 
effective energy approach, and to establish a network of energy correspondents from 
Commission services, Commission delegations in third countries and representatives 
from the Member States (Landaburu, 2007: 4-5).   
 
However, it is not enough to have a common vision--the Union needs concrete 
policies. First of all, it needs to have a clear policy on securing and diversifying 
energy supplies (European Commission, 2006: 15). In this respect, the upgrading and 
construction of new infrastructure for energy supplies, particularly new gas and oil 
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pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, can help to attain this policy 
objective  (European Commission, 2006: 15). As implied by the famous remarks by 
Churchill, diversification of energy, whether by supplier, source or transporter 
country, is commonly seen as a cornerstone of effective policy initiatives to secure 
energy. As Belkin (2007: 9) states, for EU, “over 20 years, one of the most important 
energy security challenges will be its ability to diversify the sources and modes of its 
energy imports”. For Morelli (2006: 10), as also indicated in European Commission 
(2006: 15), diversification can be improved by turning EU’s attention to energy 
resources other than Russia, such as the Caspian region, the Middle East and North 
Africa. Accordingly, EU needs to enhance its relations with various energy supplier 
and transporter countries.  
 
The second external policy suggested in the Green Paper is to enhance energy 
partnership with producers, transit countries and other international actors, such as 
Russia, Norway, Ukraine, Caspian basin, Mediterranean countries, OPEC, Gulf 
Cooperation or other consumer countries such as US and China. There are two 
prioritized ways in order to attain this policy objective. First of all, it is important to 
intensify dialogue with major energy suppliers, Russia being a particular focus for 
the Commission. Secondly, it is important to develop a pan-European Energy 
Community. This can increase security of supply for the EU together with its 
neighbors via developed “common trade, transit and environmental rules, market 
harmonization and integration” (European Commission, 2006: 16). A pan-European 
energy community is also important to “promote the best long-term use of 
community investment through the established networks” (European Commission, 
2006: 16). 
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A third policy concerns effective response to external crisis situations.  In order to 
“react quickly and in a fully coordinated manner” to external crisis, the Commission 
suggests acquiring the necessary mechanisms, namely, an early warning  monitoring  
mechanism (European Commission, 2006: 16). This objective serves the need of the 
Union for a common stance and single voice in a crisis situation. The fourth 
suggested external policy pertains to making the EU’s energy security more 
coherent. The Commission states the importance of integrating energy into other 
policies having external dimensions. With this objective, the Commission suggests to 
embed energy security priorities in all bilateral or multilateral agreements or external 
relations of the Union, on issues such as “climate change, energy efficiency, 
renewables resources, research and development of new technologies and investment 
plans” (European Commission, 2006: 16). As the last and the fifth policy objective, 
the Commission suggests promoting development through energy initiatives, 
including energy efficiency and renewable energy programmes. 
 
In the light of the aforementioned study, it can be concluded that an external energy 
policy of the Union is vital in order to attain its security objectives. Without balanced 
and coherent internal and external energy policy initiatives, it is hard to enhance 
energy security. Particularly for an imported-energy dependent actor such as the EU, 
quality of external relations with producers, transit countries or other consumers is 
critical. A more detailed study of EU’s relations with major energy suppliers and 
different paths of transporting energy follow below. 
 
 
 
 
 
64 
4.3.1. EU Relations and Partnerships with Its Major Energy Suppliers  
 
While studying the energy security of the EU, it is important to study its external 
relations and partnerships with major energy suppliers and diversified energy 
sources. As an imported energy dependent actor, European Union suffered notably 
from the Russia-Ukraine dispute of 2006. Being heavily dependent on a single 
supplier, namely Russia, the Union bore some of the impact of the dispute, as the 
Ukraine passed on much of the burden of the Russian cutoff to successively 
westward consumers in Europe. In this respect, due to Russian efforts to obtain 
control of pipeline exports the Union started to give more consideration to energy 
security policies and realized the importance of diversifying energy imports and 
transit routes more  (Tekin and Williams, forthcoming 2009: 340). 
 
 
4.3.1.1. EU-Russia Energy Relations 
 
Due to the increasing gap between the EU’s energy production capacity and its 
growing demand, it relations with the world’s largest exporter of natural gas and 
second largest oil exporter, Russia have become a crucial security factor (Bahgat, 
2006: 968). Particularly, due to Europe’s highest dependency ratio on Russia22, its 
partnership with the latter has become a major focus of EU energy policy. However, 
it is not a unilateral dependency: Russia needs EU just as much as the EU needs 
Russia, and the partnership between them needs to be examined in this context. 
                                                 
22 In 2006, 33% of the imported oil and 42% of the imported natural gas was from Russia (European 
Commission, EU Energy in Figures 2007/2008, 2008: 14). 
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As EU wants non-discriminatory and fair treatment from Russia and a long-term 
trustful energy partnership, Russia also wants to maintain the demand for its energy 
in the EU market (External Energy Relations-From Principal to Action: 
Communication from the Commission to the European Council, 2006: 4). Russia 
exports nearly half of its remaining oil and gas, after its consumption, to the EU 
(Tekin and Williams, forthcoming 2009: 342). According to Commission words; 
 
Russia wants a stronger presence in the EU internal energy market, 
ensured long term gas supply contracts, the integration of electricity 
grids and free trade for electricity and nuclear materials, as well as 
acquisition and control of downstream EU energy assets (gas and 
electricity) and EU investments and technology for the development 
of the Russian energy resources(External Energy Relations-From 
Principal to Action: Communication from the Commission to the 
European Council, 2006:4). 
 
 
In short, as Bahgat (2006: 969) suggests, cooperation rests on a simple bargain, 
“Europe’s investments in return for Russia’s oil and gas.” In such a relationship of 
mutual dependency, partnership between them gains more consideration and needed 
to be institutionally controlled. In this respect, the Energy Charter Treaty and the EU-
Russia Energy Dialogue are significant institutional mechanisms aimed to address 
collective energy relations between them (Belkin, 2007: 11). 
 
As a first step in the cooperation between EU and Russia, the Energy Charter Treaty 
derives from the experiences of Cold War. Experiencing the drawbacks of 
ideological and political divisions, the two powers wanted to erase such kind of 
divisions and promote cooperation in the energy sector (Bahgat, 2006: 968). Russia, 
in need of substantial investment in order to use its rich energy resources, and the 
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EU, in need of diversified energy sources, was appropriate partners for energy 
cooperation. Thus, in keeping with this mutual interest, two parties signed the Energy 
Charter Treaty in 1994. The treaty’s provisions were focused on energy investment, 
free trade in energy materials, and freedom of energy transit, reduced environmental 
damages and resolution of disputes. Having all necessary points in order to establish 
a trustful cooperation, the treaty was signed in 1994 and came into effect in 1998 
(Bahgat, 2006: 968). Yet, Russia has not ratified the treaty. According to Belkin 
(2007: 12), unless Russia ratified the treaty and gave some concessions, Europe’s 
energy security will be largely under Russian control. Even the 2006 Green Paper 
acknowledges the importance of the ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty and 
states that efforts should be intensified in order to secure rapid ratification of the 
Treaty by Russia (European Commission, 2006: 15).  
 
In lieu of a working Energy Charter, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue represents the 
most effective instrument for regulating their energy relations. Belkin (2007: 12) 
describes this dialogue as the first fruits of the energy dialogue launched between 
Russia and EU at the Paris Summit in October 2000: 
 
…to raise all issues of common interest relating to the energy sector, 
including the introduction of cooperation on energy saving, 
rationalization of production and transportation infrastructures, European 
investment possibilities, and relations between producer and consumer 
countries (Grant and Barysch, 2003:1). 
 
 
According to Eighth Progress Report of EU-Russia Energy Dialogue (2008) 
intensified cooperation in the energy area, including sustainability and reliability of 
production, distribution, transportation and efficient use of energy can be achieved 
through the main instrument of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue.  
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The first report of 2001 laid out the basic initiatives of the dialogue. The short term 
initiatives included legal security for long term supplies, new strategic transport 
infrastructure of common interests, improvement of energy production and transport 
legal framework, security of transport network and energy efficiency. Long-term 
initiatives included an investment support scheme, cooperation in the field of climate 
change, technology cooperation, trade in electricity, energy efficiency and 
renewables, corporate governance and fast-track dispute settlement procedure. 
 
The best known evidence for the relative success of this dialogue consists of the 
“setting up of a center for energy technology in Moscow in 2004; the negotiations to 
improve safety for transportation of oil by sea and most significantly, the 
construction of the north European pipeline” (Bahgat 2006: 969). Furthermore, 
Russia’s signature and ratification of Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with efforts to 
tackle climate change, may also be listed as indirect evidence of the success. 
 
Thus, it can be concluded that mutual dependence between two powers, EU and 
Russia, reinforced further efforts to cooperate. Starting with the Energy Charter 
Treaty of 1994 and enhanced by the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue of 2000, efforts 
strengthened the cooperation between them.  
 
However, the cooperation does not function smoothly. Problems originating from 
both sides put obstacles in the process of operation. The first of the problems has 
arisen from the EU side. With 27 member states, each with different attitudes and 
action plans, it is hard to compromise on how to best proceed vis-à-vis Russia. 
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Despite efforts towards a common energy policy, there is still no concrete and 
binding energy policy. Some member states, such as Germany and Italy, maintain 
their own bilateral energy deals with Russia, whereas others, such as Poland and 
Baltic states, harshly criticize these bilateral deals as new forms of appeasement 
(Morelli, 2006: 13) 
 
On the other hand, Russia sees energy as an important political force and uses it as a 
political tool, which is detrimental to its energy partners, essentially the EU. 
Particularly, the close ties between the two related energy giants of Russia, Gazprom 
and Rosneft, with the government, make it obvious how energy and political goals 
can become intertwined. The Russia-Ukraine dispute of 2006 demonstrates that 
Russia can use its energy power as a political tool to influence EU energy security.  
 
If the EU can establish a common energy policy, it may be able to take precautions 
against being damaged by Russia’s political energy manuevers. It can lessen its 
dependence on Russian energy by diversifying its dependence on other regions, or it 
can adapt to the behavior and practices of Gazprom so as not to have problems with 
Russian government, which heavily influences the strategies pursued by its major 
energy companies (Morelli, 2006: 14). In order to be free of dependence on external 
influence, it is more prudent to lessen dependence on Russia and increase 
diversification of suppliers over time.  
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4.3.1.2. EU-Middle East Energy Relations 
 
Middle East is a broad region, comprising the countries of the Persian Gulf and 
North Africa that also comprise the majority of OPEC members. With the largest 
proven oil and natural gas reserves, Middle East is the most important energy-
producing region of the world (Bahgat, 2006: 973). Although it is not the most 
important one, the Middle East is the EU’s second largest energy supplier. As the 
most important energy-producing region of the world, the Middle East, unlike 
Russia, is also connected to a wider range of major consuming markets, including 
Europe, the US and the Far East (Bahgat, 2006: 973).  
 
The Persian Gulf countries (Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
United Arab Emirates) hold over half of the world’s oil reserves and produce 31% of 
the world’s oil as well as nearly half of world total gas (Morelli, 2006: 17). With the 
development of liquified natural gas (LNG), gas exports from Persian Gulf have 
increased. However, most of Gulf oil is directed to East or to the United States, not to 
the EU. Yet, this does not erode EU’s interest in the region (Bahgat, 2006: 974). In 
the last several years, economic and trade agreements with energy implications have 
indeed increased between Gulf and the EU (Bahgat, 2006: 974). Although, 
authoritarian monarchies are seen as problem for the Western powers, their being 
“well-run” in the Gulf region does not create a concern for the EU (Youngs, 2007: 
11). Due to the energy potential of the region, the Union wants to have increased and 
stable energy relations with the region. In this respect, EU-Gulf Cooperation Council 
Dialogue has created an inchoate base between the Gulf and EU since 1988 
(European Commission, The EU& Gulf CooperationCouncil) 
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Moreover, energy relations with North Africa and Mediterranean coast countries 
have steadily improved over the years. Particularly, with the establishment of Euro-
Mediterranean Energy Partnership in 1995, relations of the Union with the region 
were strengthened (Morelli, 2006: 17). It comprises 35 members, 25 EU Member 
States and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) (Director General for 
Energy, The Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership). The EU aims to achieve a 
stable environment for energy investments and energy security, whereas 
Mediterranean and North African countries aim to tap a lucrative channel for 
investment and technical assistance (Bahgat, 2006: 974). The partnership seeks to 
augment economic and financial cooperation, and since energy is priority for 
economic well-being, the partnership has gained an energy dimension. 
 
 In the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Energy Ministers in 1998, security of 
supply, competitiveness and environmental protection were put forward as the 
objectives of Euro-Mediterranean partnership on energy (Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership).  Furthermore, Energy Directorate states three priority areas as for the 
partnership:  
…harmonization and integration of energy markets and harmonization of 
legislation, sustainable development in the energy sector and initiatives 
of common interest in three areas; infrastructure extension, investment 
financing and research and development (The Euro-Mediterranean 
Energy Partnership). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
71 
4.3.1.3. EU- Norway Relations 
 
Norway is the third largest energy exporter to the EU after Russia and Middle East. 
According to the latest survey of Energy Information Administration, Norway holds 
6.895 trillion barrel of oil and 104.568 trillion cubic feet natural gas of world proven 
reserves (Energy Information Administration, 2008). The Union is dependent on 
Norway for 15,8 percent of its oil and 24,2 percent of its gas (European Commission, 
2008:14).   
  
Moreover, “the United States Geological Survey has estimated that almost 25% of 
the globe’s yet discovered resources are located  in the Arctic Sea” (Morelli, 2006: 
19). In such a context, Norway emerges one of the most important potential energy 
suppliers of the world and of the EU. However, for the Union, it has a more 
significant meaning. Norway is an important partner for the Union’s energy security 
policies, notably in terms of diversification policy objectives. Particularly, Norway’s 
participation to the LNG export market has created new opportunities for the Union 
in order to cooperate with its northern neighbor on energy security (Belkin, 2007: 
19). It made Norway’s importance on energy security more explicit for the Union. 
 
European Commission’s president Barroso’s statements underscore most succinctly 
what Norway means for the Union. According to Barroso (2008), Norway is a very 
close partner of the Union and shares Union’s values and policy objectives on 
various policy areas, particularly on energy security issues; 
...Our energy and climate change relationship is no less special. Norway 
is an essential gas supplier, for example, exporting all its produced gas to 
the EU. It is also fundamental to our security of energy supplies. In fact, 
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if all our external suppliers were as sure and reliable as Norway, energy 
security would be much less of an issue within the EU today!  
 
 
Besides being a reliable partner, Norway has also made significant efforts on 
environment and renewables, included among the EU’s priorities on energy security. 
Norway and the Union, jointly or individually, try to set examples for the rest of the 
world to emulate, on energy and climate change (Barroso, 2008). European Energy 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs underlines the importance of Norway as such: 
Norway is not only an important energy supplier to the EU, it is a partner 
in developing an energy policy for Europe to meet the new challenges 
facing us. In particular, we have a common view on the need not only to 
develop new sources of oil and gas supplies, particularly in the Arctic 
region, but also to actively and positively address climate change in a 
way that provides concrete benefits for our citizens. This can be done 
notably through better technology such as carbon capture and storage and 
through energy efficiency, as well as by promoting renewable energy. An 
effective collaboration between the EU and Norway on these and other 
energy issues can make a real contribution (EU-Norway Energy 
Dialogue, 2005). 
 
 
With such a reliable partner as Norway, the Union can diversify its energy sources as 
much as possible away from unreliable ones that do not share its other core values. 
Being so close to EU membership twice, yet spurning membership itself, Norway is 
very close to the Union. As Barroso (2008) states “Norway is as integrated into EU 
structures as it is possible to be without actually being a Member State.” In this 
respect, having a partner like this is vital for the Union’s energy security 
considerations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
4.3.1.4. EU-Caspian Region Energy Relations 
 
Due to energy security considerations, the significance of the Caspian region 
increased for the imported-energy dependent actors. Highly focused on the oil and 
gas potential in the region, imported-energy dependent actors have sought ways to 
enhance the relationship with the region since the collapse of Soviet Union. 
European Union is one of the actors that have increased its involvement in the 
Caspian basin region23.  
 
The Union aims to have close relations with region. For this purpose, it tried 
establish certain type of mixed agreements, called partnership and cooperation 
agreements, extending from mercantile trade and investment protection to protection 
of intellectual property rights (Alekperov, 2004: 118). Cooperation of the Union and 
the Caspian states has largely been shaped around TACIS program (Technical 
Assistance to CIS countries), including the INOGATE project (Interstate Oil and Gas 
Transport to the Union) (Alekperov, 2004: 118).  It is with this project that the 
Union’s relations with the region were formalized in 1995 (Bahgat, 2006: 971).  
 
The INOGATE  programme represents the third leg of the EU’s effort to complete its 
internal market . Since the internal market relies for its efficacy on enhanced external 
relations, there should also be regulations on external relations with energy suppliers. 
In this context, EU has aimed to develop its partnerships with energy suppliers and in 
                                                 
23 The Caspian basin is shared by five countries; Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan. However, while talking about the increased relations with region in order to diversify 
energy dependency, Russia will not be included. Since energy relations with Russia is detailly 
examined and since the dependency on Russia is highly huge for the Union, Russia will not be 
implicated for the “Caspian region” conception of this part. 
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order to attain this goal, it has actualized three broad initiatives. The first was the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, the second one was the Euro-Mediterranean partnership 
and the third was INOGATE (Kalyuzhnova, 2005: 67). 
 
 INOGATE programme aims “to promote European investment in the Caspian Sea/ 
Central Asian states in return for their cooperation in supplying energy to the EU 
member states” (Bahgat, 2006: 971). In other words, it aims to develop certain 
“comprehensive, negotiable proposals” in order to have new investments for new 
pipeline routes and for enlarging the existing ones (Alekperov, 2004: 118). In this 
framework, interstate oil and gas transportation systems are prioritized.  Although, 
the INOGATE Umbrella agreement entered into force in 2002, it has not functioned 
smoothly due to the problems arising from the region and the EU’s limited influence 
over these problems (Bahgat, 2006: 971). 
 
Caspian region with its promising energy potential can be advantageous if major 
“hurdles” about the region, ethnic conflict and legal status of Caspian Sea, can be 
overcome (Bahgat, 2004: 116).24 It is believed that export pipelines can spur 
economic development and bring peace and prosperity to the region in the long term, 
but it is not certain competition over pipelines will lead to the resolution of extant 
problems (Bahgat, 2004: 126). Consequently, the actors interested in this region find 
themselves in a struggle to overcome the challenges of the region.  
 
                                                 
24 Ethnic conflict arising from the region and the problems about legal status of Caspian sea will be 
explained in detailed in the next chapter. 
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In conclusion, Caspian basin region is one of the most important energy supply 
region of the contemporary world order. Although the hydrocarbon deposits it owns 
do not match those of the Middle East and it is likely to become just a new “North 
Sea”, the region is significantly important in terms of the diversification of sources 
(Bahgat, 2005: 14 and Olcott, 1999: 307). Particularly, with Azerbaijan and Kazakh 
energy resources, the imported-energy dependent countries aim to diversify their 
dependency. If the challenges can be dealt and if the economic benefits fully 
materialize for the investor companies, the operating and projected pipelines will be 
key to this diversification. In this context, it can be suggested that, “bringing Caspian 
energy online is seen as one of the most significant developments of this decade” 
(Rabinowitz et al., 2004: 20, quoting Ivanovich, 1998). 
 
As a result, imported-energy dependency has made major consuming actors 
vulnerable. Being dependent on unreliable partners is most risky. With its heavy 
external dependency, the Union is in need of reliable and diversified energy partners. 
Russia is the most important energy partner of the Union. Having mutual interest, the 
parties have developed a partnership since 1990s. However, being dependent on EU 
in order to export its energy, has not compelled Russia to adopt the EU terms of the 
partnership. Besides not ratifying Energy Charter Treaty, Russia proved that it is not 
a reliable partner in 2006 with the dispute between Russia and Ukraine. Russia cut 
off gas exports, which made the Union more concerned about its energy security and 
diversification.  In this context, besides solidifying relations with the Middle East, 
the Union has tried to improve its relations with Norway and the Caspian region 
countries.  
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Although the Caspian is seen as an important alternative energy supplier, however, 
its existence as a landlocked region requires a large number of transboundary 
pipelines and new transit routes in order to export the energy from this region to 
Europe. In this context, energy transit countries have also gained more consideration.  
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
Experiencing the negative consequences of  energy’s usage as a political tool during 
the 1973-1974 oil crisis and 2006 Russia-Ukraine dispute, energy security has gained 
more consideration for the EU and consequently the Union realized the need for 
more weight to common energy policy. In this regard, speaking with a single voice 
on internal and external policies gained more consideration in order to attain 
sustainability, security of supply and competitiveness. However, to speak with a 
single voice is not enough, coherence and balance between internal and external 
policies is also a priority in order to be successful and to attain all objected policies. 
An internal policy without backing by the corollary external measures cannot be 
successful. That is, diversifying energy mix or furthering efficient energy uses is not 
enough if stable relations with diversified suppliers cannot also be attained.  As the 
next chapter shows, if the Union does not have regulated and enhanced relations with 
the transit countries, some part of the “energy security” puzzle is missing and needed 
to be filled.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
TURKEY’S IMPORTANCE IN EU’S ENERGY 
SECURITY AND TURKEY’S POSSIBLE FUTURE 
MEMBERSHIP IN THIS CONTEXT 
 
 
 
Diversification of energy sources and energy suppliers has been examined until now, 
but now it is necessary to turn to diversification of transit countries. The Union has 
not much alternatives, actually it has few alternatives in terms of diversifying its mix 
of energy transit countries. It is bound to three major transit countries in the end, 
Ukraine, Turkey and Belarus. Among them, although Ukraine is the most important 
transit country to transport gas of the Union’s main energy supplier, Russia, Turkey 
needs to be considered in more detail (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003: 13). 
 
As a candidate member of the Union, Turkey has been endeavoring to enhance its 
relations with the Union. Being close to all major energy suppliers of the Union, 
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except Norway and the western parts of North Africa, Turkey has the potential to 
constitute an energy hub to diversify routes of exported/imported energy. 
Accordingly,  this chapter focuses on Turkey’s importance as an energy hub for EU’s 
energy security and its possible membership to EU in this context. 
 
The first part of this chapter examines the energy pipelines passing via Turkey and 
the ones ending in Turkey, yet with the potential to be extended to Europe. This part 
studies routes from East to West and from North to South. In the second section, 
challenges to Turkey’s role in this regard are examined. The challenges originate 
both from the suppliers and from the EU. In the third part, the effects of Turkey’s 
being an energy hub on Turkey’s accession process are examined and in the light of 
the aforementioned framework, Turkey’s possible membership is evaluated. 
 
 
5.1. Pipeline Passing Via Turkey  
 
Due to the increased security concerns of contemporary world, imported-energy 
dependent countries are increasingly looking for opportunities to diversify their 
energy sources. It can be done in terms of source, supplier or diversified transit 
routes. Thus, transit countries have gained as much attention as the energy suppliers 
themselves. Particularly, due to Middle East and Caspian Basin countries being 
among the most significant energy suppliers of the Union and due to their geographic 
locations, diversified transit countries and energy routes have increased in 
(Kalyuzhova, 2005: 69-70). In this framework, Turkey, a potential route for 
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European energy imports from the Middle East and Caspian Basin via pipelines or 
sea, has gained undeniable consideration. 
 
Geographical advantages have afforded Turkey the opportunity to play the role of 
supplier of energy resources, to be an energy supermarket and as Bahgat suggests, to 
be an “energy-bridge” (Biresellioğlu, 2007; Bahgat, 2002: 317).  It is in this respect 
that Turkey’s importance to the EU, which is trying to diversify its energy resources, 
has increased. Besides having access to major sea transport routes, like the Black Sea 
and Mediterranean, Turkey feeds and probable to feed Europe with many oil and gas 
pipelines. Since, there are many pipelines passing via Turkey, this part will examine 
them under two directions, the ones expanding between East-West and North-South. 
 
 
5.1.1 East-West Corridor: 
  
5.1.1.1. Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline (BTC) 
 
 BTC pipeline project is the first of a series of projects that will decrease the 
dependency of the Caspian region on the Russian Federation and enhance the energy 
security of Europe (Arslanalp, 2008). Although, oppositions arose due to cost and 
insufficient economical benefits, the BTC pipeline began construction on September, 
2002 (Bahgat, 2004: 119; Williams and Tekin: 2008: 391). It was opened on May 25, 
2005 in the Sangachal terminal near Baku. However, the inauguration ceremony of 
the BTC pipeline was held on July 13, 2006 (İpek, 2006: 3).  
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BTC pipeline is one of the most important pipeline projects that enhance Turkey’s 
significance in terms of energy security. Particularly, with problems on Iraqi oil 
production and exports, the BTC pipeline’s “commercial rationale” enhanced 
(Williams and Tekin, 2008: 384)25. In total, BTC pipeline is 1768 km in length and 
runs from Baku to Tblisi and then to Ceyhan marine terminal, the Mediterranean 
coast of Turkey, where the oil is loaded to tankers for transportation. In its full 
capacity, which was scheduled for 2009, the pipeline would carry one million barrels 
a day, one percent of the world’s daily oil requirement (Bacık, 2006: 301) 
  
The pipeline is politically and economically important to connect landlocked 
Azerbaijan to Western markets. It was planned to provide an alternative for the 
continuous flow of oil and gas independent from Russia (Udum, 2001: 10). It is in 
this respect that it has gained support from the Caspian region and the European 
Union. It also enhanced the strategic position of Turkey vis-à-vis both the Caspian 
region and Europe (Arslanalp, 2008).  On the other hand, it made Turkey more 
secure by decreasing traffic in Bosphorus Straits.26 Ceyhan is also seen as an 
advantageous port due to its capability of handling large tankers and favorable 
weather conditions together with nearness to European markets (Rabinowitz et al., 
2004:30). Furthermore, BTC pipeline signals Turkish determination to be an east-
west energy corridor (Oktay and Çamkıran, 2006: 165). 
 
 
                                                 
25 With the Iraq war, the oil infrastructure fell under occupation and felt the negative consequences of 
various sabotages and disrepair. Thusly, other pipeline projets such as BTC gained momentum for 
world markets in order to reach additional oil supply (Williams and Tekin, 2008: 384). 
26 The highly oil loaded tankers passing Bosphorus has always been a concern for Turkey and even 
energy importers and exporters, which care the environment.  Since EU is an instution having  highly 
environmental concerns, the decrease in the Bosphorus passege will also make Europe content. 
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5.1.1.2. Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline 
 
This pipeline, which is 600 mile length, is the largest crude oil export line of Iraq. 
Due to the expansion of projects and the completion of the second line, the pipeline 
had the capacity of 1,65 million barrels per day (bpd) before the First Gulf War 
(Orekli, 2003:8). However, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was officially closed since 
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq 17 years ago. Yet, some exports have been allowed 
for the last twenty years (BBC News, 2000).  
 
Since the  Iraq war, the actual use of the pipelines has fluctuated considerably. Due 
to the attacks, the days that the pipelines has been shut down have exceeded the 
number of days that they are open. The maximum flow through the pipelines since 
the war began has been 750,000 bpd (Fink, 2006: 2). Now, repair of pumps and 
metering stations in Iraq are needed in order to increase exports to pre-1990 levels 
(Orekli,2007:8)27. There are some efforts to revitalize the project with the peaceful 
and stable Iraq but they are probable to be sustained in the long-run. The 
rearrangements in order to revitalize the project can be called “pipe gas to EU’” and 
“‘liquified natural gas to US’” (İpek, 2006: 5). 
 
5.1.1.3. South Caucasus (Shah Deniz) Natural Gas Pipeline (SCP) 
 
SCP pipeline is projected to bring Azeri gas through Georgia to Turkey. It runs 
parallel to the BTC oil pipeline along most of the route before combining with 
                                                 
27 Iraq suffers from 900,000 and 450,000 daily barrels losses output and  export shortfall, respectively, 
compared to prewar levels (Williams and Tekin, 2008: 393) 
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Turkey’s national gas pipeline grid at Erzurum (İpek, 2006: 4). The gas contract 
between Turkey and Azerbaijan was signed on March 12, 2001, and envisagages a 
fifteen-year gas trade between the two (Bacık, 2006: 299). The gas trade started in 
2004 in the framework of the contract and the pipeline completed by the end of 2006. 
However, due to the problems, the gas started to be pumped on July, 2007 (BP, 
2008). Total capacity is planned to reach 6, 6 billion cubic meters by 2009 (Winrow, 
2005: 93). Technical problems arose during construction, but it is known that most 
important reasons for the problems were Russian policies about gas prices that it 
imposed on Azerbaijan and Georgia (Pamir, 2007: 21). At full potential, it was 
planned to be the most important route for exporting gas from the second largest gas 
exporter of Caspian region, Azerbaijan (Alekperov, 2004: 120). This pipeline will 
help Azerbaijan to deliver gas to Turkey and Europe along a route that does not run 
through Russian territory (Winrow, 2005: 93). 
 
 
5.1.1.4. Turkey-Greece- Italy Natural Gas Pipeline 
 
 This pipeline developed as part of South Eastern Gas Ring interconnecting gas 
network of Turkey and Greece. According to the Natural Gas Sales and Purchase 
Agreement of Turkey and Greece, signed in December 2003, the pipeline was 
supposed to be an extension of the natural gas pipeline from Turkey to Greece and to 
Italy by an offshore pipeline (İpek, 2006: 5). It will carry Caspian region natural gas 
to Europe. The project’s significance is that it originated with European states and 
was thusly supported by EU-TEN (Bacık, 2006: 300).  
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The total capacity of the project, finished in 2007, will reach 11 billion cubic meters 
by 2012, and it is planned to carry 8 billion cubic meters of this gas to Italy (Bacık, 
2006: 300). 209 to 300 km of the pipeline is planned to be on Turkish territory 
(Akçollu, 2006:25). The whole pipeline reaching Italy is expected to be finished by 
2012 (Borgen, 2008). 
 
 
5.1.1.5. Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline 
 
This project aims to transport natural gas from the Caspian and Central Asian regions 
to Europe via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria (European 
Parliament, 2006). The project had the political backing from the European 
Commission on June 26, 2006. It is planned to have 31 billion cubic meters capacity 
and to be in operation by 2011 (İpek, 2006: 4) Nabucco is one of the most 
strategically important projects that will enable Turkey to become the main export 
route for natural gas to Europe (Arslanalp, 2008).  Energy Commissioner Piebalgs 
declared the Nabucco pipeline as “essential to Europe and the EU’s most important 
gas supply project” (Tekin and Williams, forthcoming 2009:340). The construction 
of the projet was expected to start in 2009, however it has run into difficulties 
(Williams and Tekin, 2008:396). Hungary and Austria agreed with Gazprom on 
rivalry transport and storage projects, on the other hand Turkey did not want French 
company Gaz de France, due to French opposition to Turkey’s accession, as the 
seventh member of the consortium (Williams and Tekin, 2008: 396). These problems 
put the project in jeopardy however Commission President Barosso, has been 
struggling to amend the situation (Williams and Tekin, 2008: 396). 
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5.1.1.6. Trans-Caspian Oil and Gas Pipeline Projects 
 
There are two trans-Caspian pipelines that is projected to be the part of east-west 
energy corridor (İpek, 2006: 4). First one is the trans-Caspian Kazakhstan- 
Azerbaijan-Turkey oil pipeline and the second one is the trans-Caspian 
Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe gas pipeline project that has been in the planning 
stages since 1991. The first project aims to carry oil of the Kashagan fields of 
Kazakhstan with BTC pipeline to Western markets, and was projected to start in 
2008. The pipeline was expected to carry 500,000 barrels of Kazakh oil per day with 
tankers from Aktau on the North Sea to Baku (İpek, 2006: 4). The second project 
was agreed in 1991 and the important step of the pipeline was taken in a Natural Gas 
Sale and Purchase Agreement between Turkey and Turkmenistan in 1999 (İpek, 
2006: 4). It would deliver 16 bcm/y of Turkmen gas to Turkey and possibly another 
14 bcm/y to Europe. The pipeline is intended to respond to Turkish and European 
needs (Bacık, 2006: 300). However, due to the disputes over the legal statute of 
Caspian Sea and due to demands of the now deceased authoritarian dictator Niyazov 
(“Turkmenbashi”), major financial Western firms withdrew from investment 
(Winrow, 2005: 92). The payment and price issues were the main handicaps reaching 
front of an agreement that eventually failed (Bahgat, 2004: 122).  
 
On the other hand, due to unfulfilled demands of Niyazov, Turkmenistan signed a 
25-year-agreement with Russia, giving Russia the right to buy 80 bcm Turkmen gas 
by 2009 (Winrow, 2004: 31). Thusly, Turkmenistan became bound to Russian 
energy market. With this agreement, there is not much energy left that can be sold to 
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other energy demanders for those 25 years. Otherwise, Turkey would have been a 
gateway for piping Caspian gas to European consumers (Bahgat, 2002: 324). 
 
 
5.1.1.7. Iran-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline 
 
This pipeline project has been planned in order to supply Turkish gas demand. It was 
agreed to be built in 1996 and has been active since December 2001 (Bacık, 2006: 
301). Iran is the second largest energy exporter to Turkey after Russia. It was 
decided to increase Iran’s share in Turkey’s imports from 11% to 20% by 2020 
(Arslanalp, 2008).  This pipeline is also intended to serve Europe via extension, thus 
helping to diversify Europe’s energy suppliers in the future. 
 
 
5.1.2. North-South Corridor 
 
5.1.2.1. Egypt-Turkey Natural Gas Pipeline 
 
The project aims to bring Egyptian natural gas to Turkey. It was expected to bring 4 
billion cubic meters of Egyptian gas to Turkey (Bacık, 2006: 299). Although the first 
political agreement was signed in February, 2000, the contract between two parties 
was signed in March 2001 (Bacık, 2006: 299). However, the project was canceled 
after a long period of indecision. New initiatives has been observed in the relations 
between the two parties based on the framework agreement signed on March 17, 
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2004. With this new framework, the Arab Gas Pipeline is planned to expand along  
Egypt-Syria-Turkey corridor to reach Europe (İpek, 2006: 5). Syrian and Turkish 
energy ministers even signed an agreement in June, 2003 to cooperate on gas and oil 
(Bacık, 2006: 299). 
 
 
5.1.2.2. Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline 
 
Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline is a North-South alternative to using the Turkish Straits 
to transport oil. The pipeline project was opposed by many not have the capacity to 
fully relieve tanker-traffic pressure on the Straits, yet Turkey insisted on the project 
and suggested that it would be more economic and practical (Dikbaş, 2005). With 
this pipeline 60 million tons of year of Kazakh and Russian oil will be transported by 
pipeline to Ceyhan Terminal, in addition to that supplied by BTC (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2006). The most important advantage of the project will be the 
enhancement of the security of Bosphorus navigation as intended. 
 
 
5.1.2.3. Blue-Stream Gas Pipeline 
 
This North-South pipeline differs from the other ones. Unlike the others, it is not 
projected to reach Europe. In 1998, Russia and Turkey signed an agreement for the 
sale of 565 billion cubic feet (bcf) of Russian natural gas per year, which is nearly 
equal to 16 billion cubic meters gas. With the aim of implementing the agreement, 
the Blue Stream Pipeline Company was created in order to construct a pipeline 
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between the two countries via the Black Sea (Dikbaş, 2005). The Blue Stream gas 
pipeline was officially inaugurated on November 17, 2005 (Bordonaro, 2005). The 
pipeline has three main parts. The first part is 222 mile and crosses Russia from 
Izobilnoye to Dzhugba on the Black Sea Coast. The first part is called the Russian 
onshore section. The second part, a submarine section of 235 miles on the bottom of 
the Black Sea, connects Dzhugba to Samsun on the Turkish coast. The last part is 
300 mile link from Samsun to Ankara (Power and Interest News Report, Economic 
Brief: The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, 2005). Although this pipeline was not planned 
to for extension to Europe, there have been discussions on using it to bring Russian 
gas to Europe (Winrow, 2004:  24). In that case, Europe will have an alternative way 
to ship gas from Russia. If such a project can be actualized, in a possible repetition of 
the Russia-Ukraine dispute, Europe can obtain Russian gas supply via Turkey.   
 
In conclusion, the completed projects and the projected ones will all enhance 
Turkey’s role as an energy hub, although not necessarily in the same way. In this 
context, Turkey gains a more strategic position vis-à-vis European energy security. 
Turkey is now seen as a possible key transit route and energy hub for European 
energy demand, with its potential to transport the energy supply from world’s 
important energy suppliers, Caspian Basin countries, Russia, Middle East countries 
and Egypt. This strategic position seems to be beneficial for Turkey’s possible 
membership. Turkey has been trying to be a member for a long time. It has faced 
many challenges until now. It has overcome some and has not been able to overcome 
others. However, being an energy hub seems to give the power to Turkey that it has 
needed for a long time.  
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Being in need of a reliable and continuous energy supply, the Union may admit 
Turkey as a member in order to enhance its energy security. However, Turkey is not 
a real energy hub yet. Although, all of the projects and Turkey’s reliability are 
considerable, there are some challenges, arising from the suppliers and the European 
Union on the way of Turkey’s being an energy hub for the Union and thus a future 
member.  
 
5.2. Challenges Ahead for Turkey to be an Energy Hub: 
 
As mentioned above, Turkey occupies a strategically important geographic position. 
It lies between the world’s most important energy demanders and suppliers. In this 
respect, Turkey may be central to various energy projects and expected to be a part 
of more. However, to have established pipelines or projects is not enough to make 
Turkey an energy hub and to make energy supplies flow smoothly. Various 
challenges lie ahead for Turkey to be an energy hub and for energy demanders to 
reach their expected energy. Some of the challenges arise from the energy suppliers 
and some arise from the European Union itself. This part examines the challenges 
ahead of Turkey to be an energy hub. 
  
5.2.1. Challenges Arising from the Energy Suppliers 
 
5.2.1.1. Geopolitics of Kazakh oil 
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Kazakhstan has been seen as an important energy supplier for the projects originating 
from the Caspian basin. It was a party of the Istanbul Declaration and a signatory 
during the OSCE Summit in November 1999 in order to support the construction of 
BTC pipeline. It supported the idea of building a seabed pipeline to connect Kazakh 
oil to the BTC. Furthermore, the Kashagan field was one of the main reasons to build 
the trans-Caspian pipeline. This field is the biggest offshore oil discovery anywhere 
in the world in the last thirty years (İpek, 2006:7). Yet, due to the slow progress and 
disagreements in the Kashagan project, Kazakh leaders were unwilling to start 
building a trans-Caspian pipeline (İpek, 2006:8). 
 
Additionally, relations between Kazakhstan and China made the trans-Caspian 
project even more complicated. Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, being dependent on Russia in terms of utilizing Russian pipelines to 
export their resources, sought out new ways to break free from Russia (Arslanalp, 
2008). Particularly, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan adopted multivectoral foreign 
policies involving not only the West but also China in order to overcome the 
dependency on Russia and in order to maximize their security (Kimmage, 2006). 
Thusly, strategic partnerships with Russia, China and the US became more abundant 
(İpek, 2006:8). 
 
The Kazakh relation with China is a formidable challenge to completing the trans-
Caspian pipeline. These relations started with the agreement signed in June 1997 by 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Kazakhstan for a proposed $3,5 
billion, 1,800 mile pipeline to China (Bahgat, 2004: 120). In December 2005, an oil 
pipeline from Atasu in northwestern Kazakhstan to Alashankou in northwestern 
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China was finally completed. It is suggested that at the initial stage, half of the oil 
will come from Russia, due to the insufficient Kazakh fields, and it will mean a 
closer Chinese-Kazakh-Russian energy cooperation that has the potential to put the 
trans-Caspian oil pipeline project into disarray (İpek, 206: 8). 
 
In order to balance the influence of Russia and China, US regional security policy 
suggestions were taken into consideration and involvement of Azerbaijan increased 
with this American encouragement (Arslanalp, 2008). An agreement was signed by 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on June 2006 to pump Kazakh oil into the BTC pipeline 
and a project to build a gas pipeline from Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan was announced. 
This achievement can be linked to the US interest in having increased relations with 
Azerbaijan, not to Kazakhstan willingness. 
 
 
5.2.1.2. Geopolitics of Turkmen oil 
 
Turkmenistan is another energy supplier that has stymied energy cooperation efforts. 
Energy cooperation efforts between Turkey and Turkmenistan started on May 1999. 
They signed an agreement to ship Turkmen gas to Turkey and Europe by 2002. 
Furthermore, in November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Turkmenistan 
signed an intergovernmental declaration on the legal framework pertaining to the 
Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline route, starting from Turkmenistan and running through 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey (Bahgat, 2004: 122). 
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However due to problems arising from Turkmen President Niyazov’s leadership, the 
plans stagnated. Under the authoritarian rule of Niyazov, political and economic 
reforms were nearly non-existent and majority of the multinational oil companies 
withdrew their investment from Turkmenistan (İpek, 2006:9). Due to that investment 
climate and export capacity constraints, even major multinational oil companies 
Shell and ExxonMobil closed their operations in Turkmenistan (Orekli, 2003). 
 
 However, due to the concerns about energy security in the global energy market, 
incentives to develop huge Turkmen gas fields and to extend the Azerbaijan-Turkey 
gas pipeline remain in place (South Caucasus Pipeline, SCP) (İpek, 2006: 9). Yet, the 
problems were not solved yet. 
 
Moreover, disputes over the legal status of Caspian Sea have also prevented the 
trans-Caspian shipment of Turkmen gas, as it has blocked a pipeline from 
Kazakhstan as well. There is an ongoing dispute over the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea since the emergence of newly independent states following the collapse of Soviet 
Union. Although it is known to be an important step in resolving the of landlocked 
states’ dependence on Russian transit routes, it is obviously difficult to reach a 
solution about the legal status of Caspian Sea, which also involves Russia as a littoral 
riparian state. Indeed, Russia and Iran have maintained that Caspian is an inland lake 
subject to joint control by all littoral states, while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan contend that it is a sea (İpek, 2006: 9). If Caspian Sea were to be 
accepted as a sea, it would be applicable for regulation by United Nations 
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Convention on the Law of Sea, which permits littoral-state activity in exclusive 
economic zones stretching to 200 miles offshore (Rabinowitz et al., 2004: 31).28  
 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan accept UNCLOS regulations and want to 
legitimate recognition of their rights to the part of the sea that they own. However, 
for Russia, while it is better to have sovereign rights over certain parts of the water, 
the central part should remain common property (Bahgat, 2005: 6). On the other 
hand, Iran, which has fewer oil and gas reserves, wants to have a collective approach 
and equal division of seabed resources (Rabinowitz et al.2004: 32). A common 
solution has not been reached yet, except for the general consensus that the Caspian 
Sea needs to be divided among the parties.   
 
In such a context, Turkmenistan turned to the Russian market and on April 2003 
signed a 25-year agreement (Winrow, 2004: 31). According to the agreement, Russia 
will receive up to 80 bcm/y of Turkmen gas by 2009 and thusly Russia will continue 
to serve as the key transit country for the Turkmen gas exports (Orekli, 2003). 
 
 
5.2.1.3. Bans on Re-export and Re-selling 
 
Another important challenge ahead of Turkey becoming an energy hub resides in the 
agreements that ban Turkey from re-exporting the imported gas to the third parties 
(except for the agreements with Azerbaijan) (Pamir, 2007: 21). The agreements on 
                                                 
28 UNCLOS suggests that a state may claim just 12 nautical mile territorial sea and 20 nautical mile 
exclusive economic zone (Rabinowitz et. al., 2004: 31).  
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Azeri gas contain the option of reselling which will let Turkey to export the gas that 
it imports from Azerbaijan to Europe. On the other hand, Russian gas does not have a 
resale option29 as is the case for Iran (Arslanalp, 2008). In such a context, Petroleum 
Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ) of Turkey or other important companies, have to re-
negotiate contracts with the gas supplier and obtain an export license from the 
Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) (Winrow, 2004: 31). Future natural 
gas sale and purchase deals need the approval of the EMRA. Thus, it is not possible 
for Turkey to re-export the gas that it buys from major energy suppliers without their 
permission, and Turkey cannot be an energy hub over the logical opposition of 
energy suppliers, who want to capture the bulk of rents from the transactions 
involved. 
 
 
5.2.1.4. Ethnic Conflict 
 
 The ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus region create another challenge for Turkey. The 
energy transit through the highly volatile region such as northern and southern 
Caucasus remains as potentially a crucial security problem (Winrow, 2005: 89).  
Many of the suggested oil and natural gas export routes pass through areas with 
conflicts that remain unresolved. Some of the new pipelines offer hope of long-term 
prosperity but the continuing instability and the numerous flash points of the region 
have made potential investors think before investing in the construction of the 
suggested pipelines (Bahgat, 2004: 117).  
                                                 
29 Russia is the predominant supplier of the European gas market and it exports its gas through its own 
pipelines (Arslanalp). 
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Most of the conflicts are in the Trans-Caucasus part of the Caspian region. The 
conflicts in Ngorno-Karabakh, Georgia and Chechen Republic of southern Russia all 
blocked the development of export routes from the Caspian region (Bahgat, 2004: 
117). For example, in the northern Caucasus, conflict between Russian forces and 
Chechen guerillas show no long-term promise of abating, while radical and violent 
Islamic groups are trying to destabilize regions neighboring Chechnya. Accordingly, 
the amount of the gas exported from the Caspian region has been highly influenced 
by the ethnic conflict arising from the region and in such a scenario exports from this 
region are relatively smaller than in a region at peace. Thusly, energy passing via 
Turkey is compromised and Turkey’s becoming an energy hub becomes less 
probable. 
 
 
5.2.1.5. Increasing Turbulence in the Middle East 
 
 Progress on the Iraq-Turkey and Egypt-Turkey natural gas pipeline projects also 
depends on stability in the region (İpek, 2006: 10). However, due to the instability 
and insecurity, pipelines are vulnerable to physical interference and the success of 
pipeline networks is limited (Ryan, 2002). 
 
Iraq is a good option to diversify EU energy dependency and knowing this potential, 
Turkey negotiated with Iraqi officials on a framework agreement in December 
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1996.30 However, due to the UN economic sanctions on Iraq, the project could not be 
inaugurated and it was decided to be postponed until the sanctions were lifted 
(Winrow, 2004: 34). Today, Turkey hopes to revive the project. Although prospects 
for transportation of Iraqi natural gas to Europe  improved in theory after the removal 
of the Saddam regime, due to the instability in the region, “[d]e facto occupation of 
Iraq is an obstacle ahead the projected plans” (Pamir, 2007: 21). In order to have 
efficient pipelines, the Middle East should regain its stability and as İpek (2004: 10) 
suggests “historical case studies of cross-border natural gas pipelines shows that it is 
not possible to expect peace dividend from cross-borders pipelines”. In order to reach 
the energy resources of the region, before establishing necessary pipelines, at the 
initial stage, the peace is needed in the region (Europa, European Union Documents). 
 
 
5.2.1.6. Russian Ambitions over Black Sea-Caspian Region 
 
Beside of the above mentioned challenges, the Russian ambitions to preserve control 
of various energy transportation routes and maintain influence in the Black-Sea-
Caspian region may also be stated as another obstacle ahead Turkey. Up until now, 
Russia has been the dominant energy supplier to European energy market. Even the 
Caspian states’ energy has been transported largely through Russian pipelines. 
Because the aforementioned projects that make Turkey an energy hub frontally 
challenge Russian dominance, Russia obviously opposes them in order to preserve its 
control over various energy transportation routes (Winrow, 2005, 91). Its opposition 
                                                 
30 The framework agreement was arranged to construct a $ 2,5 billion, 1,380km, 10bcm/y capacity 
pipeline to carry natural gas from five fields in northwestern Iraq to southeastern Turkey. 
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to Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline and Nabucco project exemplify Russian efforts to maintain 
its predominant position as regional energy supplier (Bacık, 2006: 297 and Winrow, 
2007: 223).  
 
 
5.2.2. Challenges arising from European Energy Market 
 
There are also challenges stemming from the European side. It is obvious that, 
Turkey’s strategic value here depends on becoming an energy hub and thus to some 
extent on the interests of the relevant energy suppliers. But the demand side is 
obviously crucial as well. In this respect, Union policies and demand need further 
consideration. The most important challenge arising from the Union is having 27 
different member states each with unique views of the collective situation. On the 
other hand, largely national energy markets, dominated by few companies, also 
creates another significant challenge (İpek, 2006: 6). However, the most important 
deficiency remains lack of a coherent energy policy.  
 
These different perceptions and desires of member states affect Turkey’s possible 
energy hub role. Due to different energy policy expectations and due to different 
policies, the pipelines passing and expected to pass via Turkey become harder to 
realize, as they rely on collective will and financing from European sources. 
Examining the competing interests and different energy policies by four EU member 
states--United Kingdom, France, Germany and Poland --will give some impressions 
about different opinions inside the Union and their affects. 
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The first main difference among the member states concerns the energy mix. Since 
each member state is free to choose its own energy fuel, there are different energy 
situations in member states. 
 
Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in 2004-(excludes electricity trade) 
MEMBER STATE 
 
Source 
 
     GERMANY 
 
         FRANCE 
 
              UK 
 
         POLAND 
Oil 36,0% 32,8% 35,9% 23,4% 
Gas 22,6% 14,3% 37,5% 12,8% 
Coal 24,6% 5,0% 16,1% 58,6% 
Nuclear 12,5% 41,6% 8,9% N/A 
Renewables 4,2% 6,2% 1,6% 5,2% 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (IEA) 
 
The table shows that four member states should have different policy preferences. 
Oil is the most important energy source for Germany, gas for the UK, nuclear for the 
France and coal for the Poland.  
 
On the other hand their opinions on the fuels are also different. While Germany 
perceives the nuclear plants as dangerous and plans to phase out nuclear power 
gradually by closing down plants, France still invests heavily in nuclear energy. The 
numbers on Polish nuclear energy use are not available but it is known that, with 
“The Energy Policy of Poland up to 2025”, which is published in January 2005, 
Poland plans to augment power generation from nuclear sources (Geden and 
Marcelis, 2006: 8). Having different energy-mix preferences indicates that natural 
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gas or oil coming from Caspian or Middle East or others does not mean the same to 
each member and cannot be expected to be supported by all. 
 
Another important point on which to compare the opinions of member states is their 
perception of energy security. Since the need of a common energy policy stems from 
the need to ensure energy security, understanding the perception of the concept is 
important. In general terms, it can be stated that four member states directly link 
energy security to security of supply (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 9). Germany has 
emphasized that energy security is one of the key objectives of German policy, to be 
dealt with mainly by securing supply. On the other hand, France also stated in the 
2005 law on energy policy that one of the objectives of the law is to ensure energy 
security. Poland also links energy security to security of supply and states that 
independence from external suppliers is the most important aim in the energy policy. 
Lastly, the UK has also declared that energy security is challenged by being 
dependent on imported energy (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 9-10). 
 
However, to have same perceptions on energy security does not mean that each 
member state supports the same policy tools in order to deal with energy security. 
Some may support the increased relations with Russia, which reduce Turkey’s 
importance, whereas some may support diminishing Russian dependency and 
focusing on alternative energy suppliers. 
 
Views on energy dialogue with Russia can be examined in the context of four 
member states’ opinions. France and the UK mention that in the relationship with 
Russia, it is necessary to apply all rules that are jointly agreed on freedom of transit 
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and permanent and non-discriminatory access to transit infrastructures. They believe 
that applying the agreed rules will improve the security of supply as well as 
transparency of gas market and ratification of Energy Charter Treaty (Geden and 
Marcelis, 2006: 18). 
 
On the other hand, Germany made a choice to rely on mainly Russia when it comes 
to energy supply. Representatives of German energy corporations state that the 
participation in Russian shipment companies will give them an unrivalled position. 
Germany aims to develop economic relations with Russia, particularly in the energy 
supply area (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 18). Conversely, Poland fears the special 
relationship between Russia and Germany, and even supports a European level 
energy policy. If Union adopts policies similar to Germany, Turkey’s becoming an 
energy hub remains a dream. On the other hand, if the Union chooses the opposite 
policy option, such as Poland’s, it become strongly possible for Turkey to be an 
energy hub. 
 
Moreover, the member states have different views on diversification, which is 
closely linked with Turkey’s future position. Although, all member states agree on 
the need of diversification, they have different views on the appropriate method. The 
needs of the members states, their geographical positions, existing links with foreign 
countries and other similar issues, together shape their perceptions and expectations 
about diversification. Some of them support diversification of suppliers, some focus 
on diversification of fuels and some focus on both (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 20). 
Among the four member states countries, Poland focuses on geographical 
diversification of suppliers, whereas the UK, France and Germany prefer 
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diversification of fuels and sources. In this respect, if the Union prefers to diversify 
its energy supply by geographical location, Turkey gains priority. However, if it 
chooses merely to diversify energy by source, such as increased nuclear and coal 
energy, then Turkey loses its role as an energy hub. 
 
Another important energy policy to examine different views of member states is the 
energy cooperation with major producers, transit countries and consumers. Member 
states generally agree on intensification of energy cooperation as part of external 
policy. In this respect, the idea of creating a pan-European energy Community, 
including for example Turkey, Ukraine, as well as Norway or Algeria, is among the 
most important of the planned energy cooperations. Moreover, cooperation with 
Middle East and North African countries is also seen as essential (Geden and 
Marcelis, 2006: 22). The UK mentions that dialogue with alternative supplier, transit 
and producer countries should be developed and supported by other three. However, 
Poland seems to be focusing its diplomatic efforts more on its eastern and southern 
borders (Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 22). The important point here is the common 
tendency toward increased dialogue with alternative energy suppliers, which 
increases Turkey’s significance vis-à-vis the Middle East and Caspian.  
 
However, the most important principle to examine is the enthusiasm for concerted 
action. After the Ukraine-Russian energy crisis, it became obvious that a common 
energy policy and speaking in unison might be necessary and all member states 
realized that to act in the EU–level about the energy policy would be more efficient 
(Geden and Marcelis, 2006: 14). Among the four, Germany stated that a long-term 
EU-wide strategy would be necessary to co-ordinate national approaches on energy 
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sources and market access issues. The UK also supports acting for a European policy 
on energy but does not want to transfer all competencies. Even France, known to be 
conservative, also pushes for a common external energy policy, whereas Poland, like 
the UK, supports the idea yet does not want to transfer all competencies. If a 
common energy policy is attained, Turkey will probably be positively affected. 
Because the Commission’s opinion is positive about enhancing Turkey’s role as an 
energy transporting country and if a common policy is achieved, effects of different 
opinions on Turkey’s importance will probably be reduced. Without a common 
energy policy favoring diversification of energy by supplier and transit country, 
increased gas and oil demand from diversified suppliers, and reduced relationship 
with Russia, Turkey is less likely to emerge as an energy hub. 
 
In conclusion, Turkey is an important partner for European Union in order to 
enhance its energy security. Being en route to Europe from many energy suppliers, 
Turkey occupies an important strategic position. Various energy pipelines, operating 
or just projected, show that Turkey has an increasing importance for European 
energy security policies and it is near to be an energy hub. However, there are 
multiple challenges arising from the suppliers and the European Union in front of 
Turkey to be an energy hub. Under current circumstances, Turkey has emerged as an 
inchoate energy hub and is likely to influence its accession relations with European 
Union in this direction. However, it is obvious that although Turkey’s strategic 
position gives it a considerable advantage in its ongoing struggle for EU 
membership, its situation faces competing imperatives.  
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5.3. Interpretation of European Union and Turkey Relations in the context of 
Union’s Energy Security Consideration and Turkey’s Possible Energy 
Hub Role 
 
Turkey and EU have a long-lasting history extending back to 1960s, when Turkey 
applied for the first time in 1959 and first official agreement was signed Ankara in 
1963. Since that time, Turkey has been struggling to be a European member and for 
this aim trying to fulfill the Union obligations. The relations between two parties 
have developed due to Turkey’s success and stagnated for some time due to Turkey’s 
failures.  
 
Although little way has been taken compared with the time period, that Turkey has 
been struggling, some significant steps have also been taken. The 1999 and 2004 
Union decisions were historical steps for Turkey. In 1999, the Union accepted 
Turkey as an official candidate and by the 2004 Helsinki Council, accession talks 
with Turkey were to be opened by October 2005. Yet, the earliest time that Turkey 
could be accepted for membership was to be 2013, and it is mostly proposed to be 
nearer to 2020, more distant and discouraging deadline for Turkey.  
 
Every member state has to fulfill specific European obligations contained in the 
“acquis communautaire”31, which is also the case for Turkey. However, Turkey 
seems to be struggling with additional unseen and unofficial criteria. However, due 
                                                 
31 The acquis is the Community patrimony, the body of common rights and obligations which bind the 
member states together. It includes the content of the Treaties, legislation, international agreements, 
and other measures (Cini, 2003: 415) 
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to Union’s increased energy security considerations, the alternative energy suppliers, 
rather than Russia, became more momentous. Thusly, Union began to give more 
importance to diversified energy transit countries, including Turkey and so Turkey 
has gained a significantly importance for the Union. Particularly, with the Russian 
energy cut due to the Russia-Ukraine dispute in 2006, EU realized the need for more 
diversification and more reliable partners. Accordingly, Turkey’s significance for the 
Union as a relatively secure and independent actor became more obvious (Tekin and 
Walterova, 2007: 87). 
 
As a candidate country, being part of many pipeline projects, Turkey’s seems to have 
gained considerable weight for possible EU membership. Although, several 
challenges are stand in front of Turkey’s being an energy hub, there are various 
possible pipelines that will enhance Turkey’s significance and membership chance. 
Even, when various European documents are examined, Turkey’s importance as an 
energy transit country, possible to be an energy hub, is clearly underscored.  
 
The Communication from the Commission to the European Council on external 
energy relations (Europa, 2006: 5) stated that Turkey is a crucial energy hub for 
supplies from the producer regions and is strategically important for the EU’s energy 
security. The document suggests that, due to the enlargement process, cooperation on 
pipeline projects and the rapid alignment of Turkey with EU energy standards and 
policies will make it easier for Turkey to become an energy hub serving Europe. The 
Commission even suggests to the European Council to help Turkey to become an 
energy hub (Paper from European Commission to European Council, An External 
Policy to Serve Europe's Energy Interests, 2006). The Commission’s suggestion is 
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most likely to be achieved only by Turkey’s membership. On the other hand, Green 
Paper (2006: 16) also stresses Turkey’s importance as an essential strategic partner. 
Even the European Parliament states in its “EU-Turkey relations in the field of 
energy document” (2006: 3) that Turkey’s political-strategic importance and EU’s 
considerations will have an important role in Turkey’s future EU membership and in 
their closer relations. 
 
 
Thusly, Turkey’s importance is growing. Turkey is expected to carry approximately 
120 billion cubic meter of gas, which will make Turkey third largest gas supplier for 
Europe (ManeEstrada, 2005: 3782). Arslanalp (2008) argues that Turkey’s 
importance may decrease if Russia starts to comply with the European Energy 
Charter and if Middle Eastern countries choose to export their gas by transforming it 
to LNG. However, he also states that the expectations remain high for Caspian 
resources and therefore Turkey has good chance to become an artery for the 
European gas market (Arslanalp). 
 
While being an energy hub is obviously not the sole requirement for joining the 
European Union, it may be what breaks the glass ceiling in front of Turkey’s possible 
membership. Turkey’s strategic position will not obviate other necessary conditions 
for becoming a European member, yet it can preclue possible new conditions that the 
Union might suggest for Turkey or it can help to win over contentemporary 
European members that are likely to oppose Turkish membership. Turkey will hasten 
the process toward membership due to its increasing energy importance. As Turkish 
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Energy Minister Hilmi Güler stated, it is possible to witness Turkey’s entrance into 
the EU with pipelines (Bacık, 2006: 34).  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This study aimed to unravel European Union’s energy security considerations and 
Turkey’s increasing importance relative to these considerations. Turkey’s possible 
Union membership is evaluated around increased European energy security 
considerations and Turkey’s being an energy hub. 
 
Increased energy need in all terms and fields of our lives made energy sources 
considerably important and thusly made “energy security” an inextricable concept of 
contemporary international relations. Whether energy supplier or consumer, energy 
security means something for all actors and made them struggle to preserve it. 
European Union is one of these actors. As other energy consumers, the Union also 
aims to have uninterrupted, affordable energy, but also with respect to environment 
and sustainable development. With this regard it aims to maintain necessary policies. 
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 Diversification; having security margin in terms of strategic reserve or adequate 
storage capacity along the supply chain; cooperation and high quality information, 
are in general the needed policies to enhance energy security for consumer actors and 
thus for the European Union. Among the suggested policies, diversification is the 
mainly perceived as the most important policy to enhance energy security and it can 
be achieved by diversifying energy sources or energy suppliers. 
  
For diversification of source, Union proposes to use different energy mixes and not 
to depend merely on gas or oil. On the other hand, about the diversification of 
supplier, Union suggests to have increased external energy relations with alternative 
suppliers. Particularly, with the experiences of 2006 Russia-Ukraine dispute, 
alternative energy suppliers, such as Middle East, Norway, Caspian Basin countries 
and Mediterranean countries, has become more valuable for the Union. In this 
regard, the transit countries  and thus Turkey have had enhanced importance for the 
Union. Turkey is one of the most considerable transit countries that has become 
momentous and has gained significant power and  Turkey’s energy transit country 
role is what seems to give it the required power to be a European Union member. 
 
When it is examined, it is seen that Turkey and EU have a long-lasting history 
extending back to 1960s, when Turkey applied for the first time in 1959 and first 
official agreement was signed Ankara in 1963. Since that time, Turkey has been 
struggling to be a European member and for this aim trying to fulfill the Union 
obligations.  
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As every member country, Turkey also has to fulfill some requirements to be a 
European Union member and to obtain the equal rights with others. However, 
Turkey seems to be struggling with additional unseen and unofficial criteria. 
According to the developments up until now, it seems that, even if Turkey is able to 
fulfill all obligations, there is a glass ceiling in front of Turkey’s membership. 
 
Yet, now Turkey has a new strength. Due to changing security considerations of the 
Union, Turkey has gained greater importance. It is not about Turkey’s strong military 
power, but about Turkey’s geostrategic position. As mentioned during the whole 
study, and as menitoned in various European documents, European Union has 
increased its efforts to increase its energy security level and in this regard, it needs 
reliable partners that it can diversify its energy supplies. Accordingly, located as a 
strategically important energy transit country, Turkey acquired the greatest chance to 
be an energy hub in the future and thus a European member.  
 
As mentioned in the fifth chapter, Turkey is involved in many pipeline projects. 
Some of them have been established whereas some are just in the planning stages. 
However, if most of the projects are actualized,Turkey will become a very essential 
energy hub for European energy supply. It is obvious that the process will not 
function smoothly. There are and will remain challenges arising from the unstable 
supplier regions and well as those arising from the Union. The challenges arising 
from the suppliers such as geopolitics of Kazakh oil; geopolitics of Turkmen oil; 
bans on re-export and re-selling option of Turkey; ethnic conflict in the energy 
supplier regions; increasing turbulences in the Middle East and Russian ambitions 
over Black Sea and Caspian Region together with challenges arising from the Union 
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with 27 different views, can create obstacles in front of Turkey’s being an energy 
hub. Yet, it is clear that, even if not all of the projects are actualized, the materialized 
ones will give Turkey its relative power, compared to its previous situation.  
 
Thusly, it can be concluded that, although, energy security has been in the agenda of 
the Union for a long time, 2006 was a milestone for energy security considerations of 
the Union and thus Turkey. With the Russian energy cut due to the Russia-Ukraine 
dispute, EU realized that it needs more diversification and more reliable partners. 
This thesis suggests that as a possible energy hub for the European Union, Turkey 
seems to have a new opportunity and strength. Due to EU’s increasing energy 
security considerations and due to increased importance of diversification, Turkey 
has become considerably important and an indispensable partner.  If energy 
continuous to be as significant as today, if Europe keep going to be an import-energy 
dependent actor and as the most important one if Turkey can overcome challenges 
ahead of it and can be an energy hub, it is highly probable for European Union to 
accept Turkey as a member state. 
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